Synchronous Online Philosophy Courses: An Experiment in Progress by McDonald, Fritz
© 2018 BY THE AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION   ISSN 2155-9708
Philosophy and Computers
NEWSLETTER  |  The American Philosophical Association
VOLUME 18   |   NUMBER 1 FALL 2018
FALL 2018    VOLUME 18  |  NUMBER 1
MISSION STATEMENT 
Opening of a Short Conversation 
FROM THE EDITOR 
Peter Boltuc 
FROM THE CHAIR 
Marcello Guarini 
FEATURED ARTICLE 
Don Berkich 
Machine Intentions 
LOGIC AND CONSCIOUSNESS 
Joseph E. Brenner 
Consciousness as Process: A New Logical 
Perspective 
Doukas Kapantaïs 
A Counterexample to the Church-Turing 
Thesis as Standardly Interpreted 
RAPAPORT Q&A 
Selmer Bringsjord 
Logicist Remarks on Rapaport on 
Philosophy of Computer Science 
William J. Rapaport 
Comments on Bringsjord’s “Logicist 
Remarks” 
Robin K. Hill 
Exploring the Territory: The Logicist Way 
and Other Paths into the Philosophy of 
Computer Science (An Interview with 
William Rapaport) 
TEACHING PHILOSOPHY ONLINE 
Fritz J. McDonald 
Synchronous Online Philosophy Courses: 
An Experiment in Progress 
Adrienne Anderson 
The Paradox of Online Learning 
Jeff Harmon 
Sustaining Success in an Increasingly 
Competitive Online Landscape 
CALL FOR PAPERS 
Philosophy and Computers
PETER BOLTUC, EDITOR    VOLUME 18  |  NUMBER 1  |  FALL 2018
APA NEWSLETTER ON
 
MISSION STATEMENT 
Mission Statement of the APA Committee 
on Philosophy and Computers: Opening of 
a Short Conversation 
Marcello Guarini 
UNIVERSITY OF WINDSOR 
Peter Boltuc 
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS, SPRINGFIELD, AND THE WARSAW
SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS 
A number of years ago, the committee was charged with 
the task of revisiting and revising its charge. This was a 
task we never completed. We failed to do so not for the 
lack of trying (there have been several internal debates 
at least since 2006) but due to the large number of 
good ideas. As readers of this newsletter know, the APA 
committee dedicated to philosophy and computers has 
been scheduled to be dissolved as of June 30, 2020. Yet, 
it is often better to do one’s duty late rather than never. 
In this piece, we thought we would draft what a revised 
charge might look like. We hope to make the case that 
there is still a need for the committee. If that ends up being 
unpersuasive, we hope that a discussion of the activities 
in which the committee has engaged will serve as a guide 
to any future committee(s) that might be formed, within or 
outside of the APA, to further develop some of the activities 
of the philosophy and computers committee. 
The original charge for the philosophy and computers 
committee read as follows: 
The committee collects and disseminates 
information on the use of computers in the 
profession, including their use in instruction, 
research, writing, and publication, and it makes 
recommendations for appropriate actions of the 
board or programs of the association. 
As even a cursory view of our newsletter would show, 
this is badly out of date. Over and above the topics in our 
original charge, the newsletter has engaged issues in the 
ethics and philosophy of data, information, the internet, 
e-learning in philosophy, and various forms of computing, 
not to mention the philosophy of artificial intelligence, 
the philosophy of computational cognitive modeling, 
the philosophy of computer science, the philosophy of 
information, the ethics of increasingly intelligent robots, and 
other topics as well. Authors and perspectives published in 
the newsletter have come from different disciplines, and 
that has only served to enrich the content of our discourse. 
If a philosopher is theorizing about the prospects of 
producing consciousness in a computational architecture, 
it might not be a bad idea to interact with psychologists, 
cognitive scientists, and computer scientists. If one is doing 
information ethics, a detailed knowledge of how users are 
affected by information or information policy—which could 
come from psychology, law, or other disciplines—clearly 
serves to move the conversation forward. 
The original charge made reference to “computers in the 
profession,” never imagining how the committee’s interests 
would evolve in both an inter- and multidisciplinary manner. 
While the committee was populated by philosophers, the 
discourse in the newsletter and APA conference sessions 
organized by the committee has been integrating insights 
from other disciplines into philosophical discourse. 
Moreover, the discourse organized by the committee has 
implications outside the profession. Finally, even if we focus 
only on computing in the philosophical profession, the 
idea that the committee simply “collects and disseminates 
information on the use of computers” never captured the 
critical and creative work not only of the various committee 
members over the years, but of the various contributors to 
the newsletter and to the APA conference sessions. It was 
never about simply collecting and disseminating. Think of 
the white papers produced by two committee members 
who published in the newsletter in 2014: “Statement on 
Open-Access Publication” by Dylan E. Wittkower, and 
“Statement on Massive Open Online Courses (MOOCs)” 
by Felmon Davis and Dylan E. Wittkower. These and other 
critical and creative works added important insights to 
discussions of philosophical publishing and pedagogy. 
The committee was involved in other important discussions 
as well. Former committee chair Thomas Powers provided 
representation in a 2015–2016 APA Subcommittee on 
Interview Best Practices, chaired by Julia Driver. The 
committee’s participation was central because much of the 
focus was on Skype interviews. Once again, it was about 
much more than collecting and disseminating. 
Over the years, the committee also has developed 
relationships with the International Association for 
Computing and Philosophy (IACAP) and International 
Society for Ethics and Information Technology. Members 
of these and other groups have attended APA committee 
sessions and published in the newsletter. The committee 
has developed relationships both inside and outside of 
philosophy, and both inside and outside of the APA. This 
has served us well with respect to being able to organize 
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sessions at APA conferences. In 2018, we organized 
a session at each of the Eastern, Central, and Pacific 
meetings. We are working to do the same for 2019, and we 
are considering topics such as the nature of computation, 
machine consciousness, data ethics, and Turing’s work. 
In light of the above reasons, we find it important to clarify 
the charges of the committee still in 2018. A revised 
version of the charge that better captures the breadth of 
the committee’s activities might look as follows: 
The committee works to provide forums for 
discourse devoted to the critical and creative 
examination of the role of information, computation, 
computers, and other computationally enabled 
technologies (such as robots). The committee 
endeavors to use that discourse not only to enrich 
philosophical research and pedagogy, but to reach 
beyond philosophy to enrich other discourses, 
both academic and non-academic. 
We take this to be a short descriptive characterization. 
We are not making a prescription for what the committee 
should become. Rather, we think this captures, much better 
than the original charge, what it has actually been doing, or 
so it appears to us. Since the life of this committee seems 
to be coming to an end shortly, we would like to open 
this belated conversation now and to close it this winter, 
at the latest. While it may be viewed as a last ditch effort 
of sorts, its main goal is to explore the need for the work 
this committee has been doing at least for the last dozen 
years. This would provide more clarity on what institutional 
framework, within or outside of the APA, would be best 
suited for the tasks involved. 
There have been suggestions to update the name of the 
committee as well as its mission. While the current name 
seems nicely generic, thus inclusive of new subdisciplines 
and areas of interest, the topic of the name may also be on 
the table. 
We very much invite feedback on this draft of a revised 
charge or of anything else in this letter. We invite not only 
commentaries that describe what the committee has been 
doing, but also reflections on what it could or should be 
doing, and especially what people would like to see over 
the next two years. All readers of this note, including 
present and former members of the committee, other APA 
members, authors in our newsletter, other philosophers 
and non-philosophers interested in this new and growing 
field, are encouraged to contact us. Feel free to reply to 
either or both of us at: 
Marcello Guarini, Chair, mguarini@uwindsor.ca 
Peter Boltuc, Vice-Chair, pboltu@sgh.waw.pl 
FROM THE EDITOR 
Piotr Boltuc 
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS, SPRINGFIELD, AND THE WARSAW
SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS 
The topic of several papers in the current issue seems to be 
radical difference between the reductive and nonreductive 
views on intentionality, which (in)forms the rift between 
the two views on AI. To make things easy, there are two 
diametrically different lessons that can be drawn from 
Searle’s Chinese room. For some, such as W. Rapaport, 
Searle’s thought experiment is one way to demonstrate 
how semantics collapses into syntax. For others, such as 
R. Baker, it demonstrates that nonreductive first-person 
consciousness is necessary for intentionality, thus also for 
consciousness. 
We feature the article on Machine Intentions by Don 
Berkich (the current president of the International 
Association for Computing and Philosophy), which is an 
homage to L. R. Baker—Don’s mentor and our esteemed 
author. Berkich tries to navigate between the horns of the 
dilemma created by strictly functional and nonreductive 
requirements on human, and machine, agency. He tries to 
replace the Searle-Castaneda definition of intentionality, 
that requires first-person consciousness, with a more 
functionalistic definition by Davidson. Thus, he agrees 
with Baker that robots require intentionality, yet disagrees 
with her that intentionality requires irreducible first-person 
perspective (FPP). Incidentally, Berkich adopts Baker’s view 
that FPP requires self-consciousness. (If we were talking 
of irreducible first-person consciousness, it would be quite 
clear these days that it is distinct from self-consciousness, 
but irreducible first-person perspective invokes some old-
school debates.) On its final pages, the article contains a 
very clear set of arguments in support of Turing’s critique 
of the Lady Lovelace’s claim that machines cannot discover 
anything new. 
In the “Logicist Remarks…” Selmer Bringsjord argues, 
contra W. Rapaport, that we should view computer science 
as a proper part of mathematical logic, instead of viewing 
it in a procedural way. In his second objection to Rapaport, 
Bringsjord argues that semantics does not collapse into 
syntax because of the reasons demonstrated in Searle’s 
Chinese room. The reason being that “our understanding” 
is “bound up with subjective understanding,” which brings 
us back to Baker’s point discussed by Berkich. 
In his response to Bringsjord on a procedural versus 
logicist take on computer science, Rapaport relies on 
Castaneda (quite surprisingly, as his is one of the influential 
nonreductive definitions of intentionality). Yet, Rapaport 
relates to Castaneda’s take on philosophy as “the personal 
search for truth”—but he may be viewing personal search 
for the truth as a search for personal truth, which does not 
seem to be Castaneda’s point. This subjectivisation looks 
like Rapaport is going for a draw—though he seems to 
present a stronger point in his interview with Robin Hill 
that follows. Rapaport seems to have a much stronger 
response defending his view on semantics as syntax, but 
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I’ll not spoil the read of this very short paper. Bill Rapaport’s 
interview with R. K. Hill revisits some of the topics touched 
on by Bringsjord, but I find the case in which he illustrates 
the difference between instructions and algorithms both 
instructive and lively. 
This is followed by two ambitious sketches within the realm 
of theoretical logic. Doukas Kapantaïs presents an informal 
write-up of his formal counterexample to the standard 
interpretation of Church-Turing thesis. Joseph E. Brenner 
follows with a multifarious article that presents a sketch of 
a version of para-consistent (or dialectical) logic aimed at 
describing consciousness. The main philosophical point 
is that thick definition consciousness always contains 
contradiction though the anti-thesis remains unconscious 
for the time being. While the author does bring the 
argument to human consciousness but not all the way to 
artificial general intelligence, the link can easily be drawn. 
We close with three papers on e-learning and philosophy. 
We have a thorough discussion by a professor, Fritz J. 
McDonald, who discusses the rare species of synchronous 
online classes in philosophy and the mixed blessings that 
come from teaching them. This is followed by a short essay 
by a student, Adrienne Anderson, on her experiences 
taking philosophy online. She is also a bit skeptical of 
taking philosophy courses online, but largely for the 
reason that there is little, if any, synchronicity (and bodily 
presence) in the online classes she has taken. We end with 
a perspective by an administrator, Jeff Harmon, who casts 
those philosophical debates in a more practical dimension. 
Let me also mention the note from the chair and vice chair 
pertaining to the mission of this committee—you have 
probably read it already since we placed it above the note 
from the chair and my note. 
FROM THE CHAIR 
Marcello Guarini 
UNIVERSITY OF WINDSOR 
The committee has had a busy year organizing sessions for 
the APA meetings, and things continue to move in the same 
direction. Our recent sessions at the 2018 meetings of the 
Eastern, Central, and Pacific meetings were well attended, 
and we are planning to organize three new sessions— 
one for each of the upcoming 2019 meetings. For the 
Eastern Division meeting, we are looking to organize a 
book panel on Gualtiero Piccinini’s Physical Computation: 
A Mechanistic Account (Oxford University Press, 2015). For 
the Central Division meeting, we are working on a sequel 
to the 2018 session on machine consciousness. For the 
upcoming Pacific Division meeting, we are pulling together 
a session on data ethics. We are even considering a session 
on Turing’s work, but we are still working out whether that 
will take place in 2019 or 2020. 
While it is true that the philosophy and computers 
committee is scheduled for termination as of June 30, 
2020, the committee fully intends to continue organizing 
high-quality sessions at APA meetings for  as long as it can. 
Conversations have started about how the work done by 
the committee can continue, in one form or another, after 
2020. The committee has had a long and valuable history, 
one that has transcended its original charge. For this issue, 
Peter Boltuc (our newsletter editor and associate committee 
chair) and I composed a letter reviewing our original charge 
and explained the extent to which the committee moved 
beyond that charge. We hope that letter communicates at 
least some of the diversity and value of what the committee 
has been doing, and by “committee” I refer to both its 
current members and its many past members. 
As always, if anyone has ideas for organizing philosophy 
and computing sessions at future APA meetings, please 
feel free to get in touch with us. There is still time to make 
proposals for 2020, and we are happy to continue working 
to ensure that our committee provides venues for high-
quality discourse engaging a wide range of topics at the 
intersection of philosophy and computing. 
FEATURED ARTICLE 
Machine Intentions 
Don Berkich 
TEXAS A&M UNIVERSITY 
INTRODUCTION 
There is a conceptual tug-of-war between the AI crowd and 
the mind crowd.1 The AI crowd tends to dismiss the skeptical 
markers placed by the mind crowd as unreasonable in light 
of the range of highly sophisticated behaviors currently 
demonstrated by the most advanced robotic systems. 
The mind crowd’s objections, it may be thought, result 
from an unfortunate lack of technical sophistication which 
leads to a failure to grasp the full import of the AI crowd’s 
achievements. The mind crowd’s response is to point out 
that sophisticated behavior alone ought never be taken as 
a sufficient condition on full-bore, human-level mentality.2 
I think it a mistake for the AI crowd to dismiss the mind 
crowd’s worries without very good reasons. By keeping 
the AI crowd’s feet to the fire, the mind crowd is providing 
a welcome skeptical service. That said, in some cases 
there are very good reasons for the AI crowd to push back 
against the mind crowd; here I provide a specific and, I 
submit, important case-in-point so as to illuminate some of 
the pitfalls in the tug-of-war. 
It can be argued that there exists a counterpart to the 
distinction between original intentionality and derived 
intentionality in agency: Given its design specification, a 
machine’s agency is at most derived from its designer’s 
original agency, even if the machine’s resulting behavior 
sometimes surprises the designer. The argument for 
drawing this distinction hinges on the notion that intentions 
are necessarily conferred on machines by their designers’ 
ambitions, and intentions have features which immunize 
them from computational modeling. 
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In general, skeptical arguments against original machine 
agency may usefully be stated in the Modus Tollens form: 
1.	 If X is an original agent, then X must have 
property P. 
2.	 No machine can have property P. 
∴	 3. No machine can be an original agent.  1&2 
The force of each skeptical argument depends, of course, 
on the property P: The more clearly a given P is such as to 
be required by original agency but excluded by mechanism 
the better the skeptic’s case. By locating property P in 
intention formation in an early but forcefully argued 
paper, Lynne Rudder Baker3 identifies a particularly potent 
skeptical argument against original machine agency. I 
proceed as follows. In the first section I set out and refine 
Baker’s challenge. In the second section I describe a 
measured response. In the third and final section I use 
the measured response to draw attention to some of the 
excesses on both sides.4 
THE MIND CROWD’S CHALLENGE: BAKER’S
SKEPTICAL ARGUMENT 
Roughly put, Baker argues that machines cannot act since 
actions require intentions, intentions require a first-person 
perspective, and no amount of third-person information 
can bridge the gap to a first-person perspective. Baker5 
usefully sets her own argument out: 
A 1.	 In order to be an agent, an entity must be able 
to formulate intentions. 
2.	 In order to formulate intentions, an entity must 
have an irreducible first-person perspective. 
3.	 Machines lack an irreducible first-person 
perspective. 
∴	 4. Machines are not agents.  1,2&3 
Baker has not, however, stated her argument quite correctly. 
It is not just that machines are not (original) agents or do 
not happen presently to be agents, since that allows that 
at some point in the future machines may be agents or 
at least that machines can in principle be agents. Baker’s 
conclusion is actually much stronger. As she outlines her 
own project, ”[w]ithout denying that artificial models of 
intelligence may be useful for suggesting hypotheses to 
psychologists and neurophysiologists, I shall argue that 
there is a radical limitation to applying such models to 
human intelligence. And this limitation is exactly the reason 
why computers can’t act.”6 
Note that “computers can’t act” is substantially stronger
than “machines are not agents.” Baker wants to argue that
it is impossible for machines to act, which is presumably
more difficult than arguing that we don’t at this time
happen to have the technical sophistication to create
machine agents. Revising Baker’s extracted argument to
bring it in line with her proposed conclusion, however,
requires some corresponding strengthening of premise
A.3, as follows: 
B 1.	 In order to be an original agent, an entity must 
be able to formulate intentions. 
2.	 In order to formulate intentions, an entity must 
have an irreducible first-person perspective. 
3.	 Machines necessarily lack an irreducible first-
person perspective. 
∴	 4. Machines cannot be original agents.  1,2&3 
Argument B succeeds in capturing Baker’s argument 
provided that her justification for B.3 has sufficient scope 
to conclude that machines cannot in principle have an 
irreducible first-person perspective. What support does 
she give for B.1, B.2, and B.3? 
B.1 is true, Baker asserts, because original agency implies 
intentionality. She takes this to be virtually self-evident; the 
hallmark of original agency is the ability to form intentions, 
where intentions are to be understood on Castaneda’s7 
model of being a ”dispositional mental state of endorsingly 
thinking such thoughts as ’I shall do A’.”8 B.2 and B.3, on 
the other hand, require an account of the first-person 
perspective such that 
•	 The first person perspective is necessary for the 
ability to form intentions; and 
•	 Machines necessarily lack it. 
As Baker construes it, the first person perspective (FPP) 
has at least two essential properties. First, the FPP is 
irreducible, where the irreducibility in this case is due to a 
linguistic property of the words used to refer to persons. In 
particular, first person pronouns cannot be replaced with 
descriptions salve veritate. ”First-person indicators are not 
simply substitutes for names or descriptions of ourselves.”9
Thus Oedipus can, without absurdity, demand that the 
killer of Laius be found. ”In short, thinking about oneself in 
the first-person way does not appear reducible to thinking 
about oneself in any other way.”10 
Second, the FPP is necessary for the ability to ”conceive of 
one’s thoughts as one’s own.”11 Baker calls this “second­
order consciousness.” Thus, ”if X cannot make first-person 
reference, then X may be conscious of the contents of his 
own thoughts, but not conscious that they are his own.”12
In such a case, X fails to have second-order consciousness. 
It follows that ”an entity which can think of propositions 
at all enjoys self-consciousness if and only if he can make 
irreducible first-person reference.”13 Since the ability to 
form intentions is understood on Castaneda’s model as the 
ability to endorsingly think propositions such as ”I shall do 
A,” and since such propositions essentially involve first-
person reference, it is clear why the first person perspective
is necessary for the ability to form intentions. So we have 
some reason to think that B.2 is true. But, apropos B.3, why 
should we think that machines necessarily lack the first-
person perspective? 
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Baker’s justification for B.3 is captured by her claim that 
”[c]omputers cannot make the same kind of reference 
to themselves that self-conscious beings make, and this 
difference points to a fundamental difference between 
humans and computers—namely, that humans, but not 
computers, have an irreducible first-person perspective.”14
To make the case that computers are necessarily 
handicapped in that they cannot refer to themselves in the 
same way that self-conscious entities do, she invites us to 
consider what would have to be the case for a first person 
perspective to be programmable: 
a)	 FPP can be the result of information processing. 
b)	 First-person episodes can be the result of 
transformations on discrete input via specifiable 
rules.15 
Machines necessarily lack an irreducible first-person 
perspective since both (a) and (b) are false. (b) is 
straightforwardly false, since ”the world we dwell in cannot 
be represented as some number of independent facts 
ordered by formalizable rules.”16 Worse, (a) is false since 
it presupposes that the FPP can be generated by a rule 
governed process, yet the FPP ”is not the result of any rule-
governed process.”17 That is to say, ”no amount of third-
person information about oneself ever compels a shift to
first person knowledge.”18 Although Baker does not explain 
what she means by ”third-person information” and ”first­
person knowledge,” the point, presumably, is that there is 
an unbridgeable gap between the third-person statements 
and the first-person statements presupposed by the FPP. 
Yet since the possibility of an FPP being the result of
information processing depends on bridging this gap, it 
follows that the FPP cannot be the result of information 
processing. Hence it is impossible for machines, having 
only the resource of information processing as they do, to 
have an irreducible first-person perspective. 
Baker’s skeptical challenge to the AI crowd may be set out 
in detail as follows: 
C 1.	 Necessarily, X is an original agent only if X has 
the capacity to formulate intentions. 
2.	 Necessarily, X has the capacity to formulate 
intentions only if X has an irreducible first 
person perspective. 
3.	 Necessarily, X has an irreducible first person 
perspective only if X has second-order 
consciousness. 
4.	 Necessarily, X has second-order consciousness 
only if X has self-consciousness. 
∴	 5.	 Necessarily, X is an original agent only if X has 
self-consciousness.  1,2,3&4 
6.	 Necessarily, X is a machine only if X is designed 
and programmed. 
7.	 Necessarily, X is designed and programmed 
only if X operates just according to rule-
governed transformations on discrete input. 
8.	 Necessarily, X operates just according to rule-
governed transformations on discrete input 
only if X lacks self-consciousness. 
∴	 9. Necessarily, X is a machine only if X lacks self-
consciousness. 6,7&8 
∴	 10. Necessarily, X is a machine only if X is not an 
original agent.  5&9 
A MEASURED RESPONSE ON BEHALF OF THE AI
CROWD 
While there presumably exist skeptical challenges which 
ought not be taken seriously because they are, for want 
of careful argumentation, themselves unserious, I submit
that Baker’s skeptical challenge to the AI crowd is serious 
and ought to be taken as such. It calls for a measured 
response. It would be a mistake, in other words, for the AI 
crowd to dismiss Baker’s challenge out of hand for want 
of technical sophistication, say, in the absence of decisive 
counterarguments. Moreover, counterarguments will not
be decisive if they simply ignore the underlying import of 
the skeptic’s claims. 
For example, given the weight of argument against 
physicalist solutions to the hard problem of consciousness 
generally, it would be incautious of the AI crowd to respond
by rejecting C.8 (but see19 for a comprehensive review of 
the hard problem). In simple terms, the AI crowd should 
join the mind crowd in finding it daft at this point for a
roboticist to claim that there is something it is like to be 
her robot, however impressive the robot or resourceful the 
roboticist in building it. 
A more modest strategy is to sidestep the hard problem 
of consciousness altogether by arguing that having an 
irreducible FPP is not, contrary to C.2, a necessary condition 
on the capacity to form intentions. This is the appropriate 
point to press provided that it also appeals to the mind 
crowd’s own concerns. For instance, if it can be argued
that the requirement of an irreducible FPP is too onerous 
even for persons to formulate intentions under ordinary 
circumstances, then Baker’s assumption of Castaneda’s
account will be vulnerable to criticism from both sides. 
Working from the other direction, it must also be argued the 
notion of programming that justifies C.7 and C.8 is far too 
narrow even if we grant that programming an irreducible 
FPP is beyond our present abilities. The measured 
response I am presenting thus seeks to moderate the mind 
crowd’s excessively demanding conception of intention 
while expanding their conception of programming so as 
to reconcile, in principle, the prima facie absurdity of a 
programmed (machine) intention. 
Baker’s proposal that the ability to form intentions implies 
an irreducible FPP is driven by her adoption of Castaneda’s20
analysis of intention: To formulate an intention to A is to 
endorsingly think the thought, ”I shall do A.” There are, 
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however, other analyses of intention which avoid the 
requirement of an irreducible FPP. Davidson21 sketches an 
analysis of what it is to form an intention to act: ”an action 
is performed with a certain intention if it is caused in the 
right way by attitudes and beliefs that rationalize it.”22 Thus, 
If someone performs an action of type A with 
the intention of performing an action of type B, 
then he must have a pro-attitude toward actions 
of type B (which may be expressed in the form: 
an action of type B is good (or has some other 
positive attribute)) and a belief that in performing 
an action of type A he will be (or probably will be) 
performing an action of type B (the belief may be 
expressed in the obvious way). The expressions of 
the belief and desire entail that actions of type A 
are, or probably will be, good (or desirable, just, 
dutiful, etc.).23 
Davidson is proposing that S A’s with the intention of B-ing 
only if 
i.	 S has pro-attitudes towards actions of type B. 
ii.	 S believes that by A-ing S will thereby B. 
The pro-attitudes and beliefs S has which rationalize his 
action cause his action. But, of course, it is not the case 
that S’s having pro-attitudes towards actions of type B and 
S’s believing that by A-ing she will thereby B jointly implies 
that S actually A’s with the intention of B-ing. (i) and (ii), 
in simpler terms, do not jointly suffice for S’s A-ing with 
the intention of B-ing since it must be that S A’s because 
of her pro-attitudes and beliefs. For Davidson, “because” 
should be read in its causal sense. Reasons consisting as 
they do of pro-attitudes and beliefs cause the actions they
rationalize. 
Causation alone is not enough, however. To suffice for 
intentional action reasons must cause the action in the 
right way. Suppose (cf24) Smith gets on the plane marked
“London” with the intention of flying to London, England. 
Without alarm and without Smith’s knowledge, a shy hijacker 
diverts the plane from its London, Ontario, destination to 
London, England. Smith’s beliefs and pro-attitudes caused 
him to get on the plane marked “London” so as to fly to 
London, England. Smith’s intention is satisfied, but only 
by accident, as it were. So it must be that Smith’s reasons 
cause his action in the right way, thereby avoiding so called 
wayward causal chains. Hence, S A’s with the intention of 
B-ing if, and only if, 
i.	 S has pro-attitudes towards actions of type B. 
ii.	 S believes that by A-ing S will thereby B. 
iii.	 S’s relevant pro-attitudes and beliefs cause her 
A-ing with the intention of B-ing in the right way. 
Notice that there is no reference whatsoever involving an 
irreducible FPP in Davidson’s account. Unlike Castaneda’s 
account, there is no explicit mention of the first person 
indexical. So were it the case that Davidson thought 
animals could have beliefs, which he does not,25 it would 
be appropriate to conclude from Davidson’s account 
that animals can act intentionally despite worries that 
animals would lack an irreducible first-person perspective. 
Presumably robots would not be far behind. 
It is nevertheless open to Baker to ask about (ii): S believes 
that by A-ing S will thereby B. Even if S does not have 
to explicitly and endorsingly think, ”I shall do A” to A 
intentionally, (ii) requires that S has a self-referential belief 
that by A-ing he himself will thereby B. Baker can gain 
purchase on the problem by pointing out that such a belief 
presupposes self-consciousness every bit as irreducible as 
the FPP. 
Consider, however, that a necessary condition on 
Davidson’s account of intentional action is that S believes 
that by A-ing S will thereby B. Must we take ’S’ in S’s belief
that by A-ing S will thereby B de dicto? Just as well, could 
it not be the case (de re) that S believes, of itself, that by 
A-ing it will thereby B? 
The difference is important. Taken de dicto, S’s belief 
presupposes self-consciousness since S’s belief is 
equivalent to having the belief, ”by A-ing I will thereby B.” 
Taken (de re), however, S’s belief presupposes at most self-
representation, which can be tokened without solving the 
problem of (self) consciousness. 
Indeed, it does not seem to be the case that the intentions I 
form presuppose either endorsingly thinking ”I shall do A!” 
as Castaneda (and Baker) would have it or a de dicto belief 
that by A-ing I will B as Davidson would have it. Intention-
formation is transparent: I simply believe that A-ing B’s, so 
I A. The insertion of self-consciousness as an intermediary 
requirement in intention formation would effectively 
eliminate many intentions in light of environmental 
pressures to act quickly. Were Thog the caveman required 
to endorsingly think ”I shall climb this tree to avoid the 
saber-toothed tiger” before scrambling up the tree he 
would lose precious seconds and, very likely, his life. 
Complexity, particularly temporal complexity, constrains us
as much as it does any putative original machine agent. A 
theory of intention which avoids this trouble surely has the 
advantage over theories of intention which do not. 
In a subsequent pair of papers26 and a book,27 Baker herself 
makes the move recommended above by distinguishing 
between weak and strong first-person phenomena (later 
recast in more developmentally discerning terms as 
“rudimentary” and “robust” first-person perspectives), 
on the one hand, and between minimal, rational, and 
moral agency, on the other. Attending to the literature in 
developmental psychology (much as many in the AI crowd 
have done and would advise doing), Baker28 argues that the
rudimentary FPP is properly associated with minimal—that 
is, non-reflective—agency, which in turn is characteristic 
of infants and pre-linguistic children and adult animals
of other species. Notably, the rudimentary FPP does not 
presuppose an irreducible FFP, although the robust FPP 
constituitively unique to persons does. As Baker puts it, 
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[P]ractical reasoning is always first personal: The 
agent reasons about what to do on the basis 
of her own first-person point of view. It is the
agent’s first-person point of view that connects her 
reasoning to what she actually does. Nevertheless, 
the agent need not have any first-person concept of 
herself. A dog, say, reasons about her environment 
from her own point of view. She is at the origin of 
what she can reason about. She buries a bone at 
a certain location and later digs it up. Although 
we do not know exactly what it’s like to be a dog, 
we can approximate the dog’s practical reasoning 
from the dog’s point of view: Want bone; bone is 
buried over there; so, dig over there. The dog is 
automatically (so to speak) at the center of the her 
world without needing self-understanding.29 
Baker further argues in these pages30 that, despite the 
fact that artifacts like robots are intentionally made for 
some purpose or other while natural objects sport no such
teleological origin, ”this differences does not signal any 
ontological deficiency in artifacts qua artifacts.” Artifacts 
suffer no demotion of ontological status insofar as they 
are ordinary objects regardless of origin. Her argument, 
supplemented and supported by Amie L. Thomasson,31
repudiates drawing on the distinction between mind-
dependence and mind-independence (partly) in light of 
the fact that, 
[A]dvances in technology have blurred the 
difference between natural objects and artifacts. 
For example, so-called digital organisms are 
computer programs that (like biological organisms) 
can mutate, reproduce, and compete with one 
another. Or consider robo-ratsrats with implanted 
electrodesthat direct the rats movements. Or, for 
another example, consider what one researcher 
calls a bacterial battery: these are biofuel cells 
that use microbes to convert organic matter into 
electricity. Bacterial batteries are the result of a 
recent discovery of a micro-organism that feeds on 
sugar and converts it to a stream of electricity. This 
leads to a stable source of low power that can be 
used to run sensors of household devices. Finally, 
scientists are genetically engineering viruses that 
selectively infect and kill cancer cells and leave 
healthy cells alone. Scientific American referred 
to these viruses as search-and-destroy missiles. 
Are these objects—the digital organisms, robo­
rats, bacterial batteries, genetically engineered
viral search-and-destroy missilesartifacts or 
natural objects? Does it matter? I suspect that the 
distinction between artifacts and natural objects 
will become increasingly fuzzy; and, as it does, 
the worries about the mind-independent/mind­
dependent distinction will fade away.32 
Baker’s distinction between rudimentary and robust FPPs, 
suitably extended to artifacts, may cede just enough 
ground to the AI crowd to give them purchase on at least
minimal machine agency, all while building insurmountable 
ramparts against the AI crowd to defend, on behalf of the 
mind crowd, the special status of persons, enjoying as 
they must their computationally intractable robust FPPs. 
Unfortunately Baker does not explain precisely how the 
minimal agent enjoying a rudimentary FPP develops into
a moral agent having the requisite robust FPP. That is, 
growing children readily, gracefully, and easily scale the 
ramparts simply in the course of their normal development,
yet how remains a mystery. 
At most we can say that there are many things a minimal 
agent cannot do rational (reflective) and moral (responsible) 
agents can do. Moreover, the mind crowd may object that 
Baker has in fact ceded no ground whatsoever, since even 
a suitably attenuated conception of intention cannot be 
programmed under Baker’s conception of programming. 
What is her conception of programming? Recall that Baker 
defends B.3 by arguing that machines cannot achieve a first-
person perspective since machines gain information only 
through rule-based transformations on discrete input and 
no amount or combination of such transformations could 
suffice for the transition from a third-person perspective to 
a first-person perspective. That is, 
D 1.	 If machines were able to have a FPP, then the 
FPP can be the result of transformations on 
discrete input via specifiable rules. 
2.	 If the FPP can be the result of transformations 
on discrete input via specifiable rules, then 
there exists some amount of third-person 
information which compels a shift to first-
person knowledge. 
3.	 No amount of third-person information 
compels a shift to first-person knowledge. 
∴	 4.	 First-person episodes cannot be the result 
of transformations on discrete input via 
specifiable rules. 2&3 
∴	 5.	 Machines necessarily lack an irreducible first-
person perspective. 1&4 
The problem with D is that it betrays an overly narrow 
conception of machines and programming, and this 
is true even if we grant that we don’t presently know of 
any programming strategy that would bring about an 
irreducible FPP. 
Here is a simple way of thinking about machines and 
programming as Argument D would have it. There was 
at one time (for all I know, there may still be) a child’s 
toy which was essentially a wind-up car. The car came 
with a series of small plastic disks, with notches around 
the circumference, which could be fitted over a rotating 
spindle in the middle of the car. The disks acted as a cam, 
actuating a lever which turned the wheels when the lever 
hit a notch in the side of the disk. Each disk had a distinct 
pattern of notches and resulted in a distinct route. Thus, 
placing a particular disk on the car’s spindle “programs” 
the car to follow a particular route. 
Insofar as it requires that programming be restricted to 
transformations on discrete input via specifiable rules, 
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Argument D treats all machines as strictly analogous to the
toy car and programming as analogous to carving out new 
notches on a disk used in the toy car. Certainly Argument D 
allows for machines which are much more complicated than 
the toy car, but the basic relationship between program and 
machine behavior is the same throughout. The program 
determines the machine’s behavior, while the program 
itself is in turn determined by the programmer. It is the 
point of D.2 that, if an irreducible FPP were programmable, 
it would have to be because the third-person information 
which can be supplied by the programmer suffices for a 
first-person perspective, since all the machine has access 
to is what can be supplied by a programmer. Why should 
we think that a machine’s only source of information is 
what the programmer provides? Here are a few reasons to 
think that machines are not so restricted: 
•	 Given appropriate sensory modalities and 
appropriate recognition routines, machines are 
able to gain information about their environment 
without that information having been programmed 
in advance.33 It would be as if the toy car had an 
echo-locator on the front and a controlling disk 
which notched itself in reaction to obstacles so as 
to maneuver around them. 
•	 Machines can be so constructed as to “learn” by a 
variety of techniques.34 Even classical conditioning 
techniques have been used. The point is merely 
that suitably constructed, a machine can put 
together information about its environment 
and itself which is not coded in advance by the 
programmer and which is not available other than 
by, for example, trial and error. It would be as if the 
toy car had a navigation goal and could adjust the 
notches in its disk according to whether it is closer 
or farther from its goal. 
•	 Machines can evolve.35 Programs evolve through 
a process of mutation and extinction. Code in the 
form of so-called genetic algorithms is replicated 
and mutated. Unsuccessful mutations are culled, 
while successful algorithms are used as the basis 
for the next generation. Using this method one can 
develop a program for performing a particular task 
without having any knowledge of how the program 
goes about performing the task. Strictly speaking, 
there is no programmer for such programs. 
Here the analogy with the toy car breaks down 
somewhat. It’s as if the toy car started out with a 
series of disks of differing notch configurations 
and the car can take a disk and either throw it out 
or use it as a template for further disks, depending 
on whether or not a given disk results in the car 
being stuck against an obstacle, for instance. 
•	 Programs can be written which write their own 
programs.36 A program can spawn an indefinite 
number of programs, including an exact copy of 
itself. It need not be the case that the programmer 
be able to predict what future code will be 
generated, since that code may be partially the 
result of information the machine gathers, via 
sensory modalities, from its environment. So, 
again, in a real sense there is no programmer for 
these programs. The toy car in this case starts out 
with a disk which itself generates disks and these 
disks may incorporate information about obstacles 
and pathways. 
Indeed, many of the above techniques develop Turing’s 
own suggestions: 
Let us return for a moment to Lady Lovelace’s objection, 
which stated that the machine can only do what we tell it 
to do. 
Instead of trying to produce a programme to 
simulate the adult mind, why not rather try to 
produce one which simulates the child’s? If this 
were then subjected to an appropriate course 
of education one would obtain the adult brain. 
Presumably the child brain is something like a 
notebook as one buys it from the stationer’s. 
Rather little mechanism, and lots of blank sheets. 
(Mechanism and writing are from our point of view 
almost synonymous.) Our hope is that there is so 
little mechanism in the child brain that something 
like it can be easily programmed. The amount of 
work in the education we can assume, as a first 
approximation, to be much the same as for the 
human child. 
We have thus divided our problem into two parts. 
The child programme and the education process. 
These two remain very closely connected. We 
cannot expect to find a good child machine at the 
first attempt. One must experiment with teaching 
one such machine and see how well it learns... 
The idea of a learning machine may appear 
paradoxical to some readers. How can the rules 
of operation of the machine change? They should 
describe completely how the machine will react 
whatever its history might be, whatever changes 
it might undergo. The rules are thus quite time-
invariant. This is quite true. The explanation of the 
paradox is that the rules which get changed in the 
learning process are of a rather less pretentious 
kind, claiming only an ephemeral validity. The 
reader may draw a parallel with the Constitution of 
the United States.37 
As Turing anticipated, machines can have access to 
information and utilize it in ways which are completely 
beyond the purview of the programmer. So while it may 
not be the case that a programmer can write code for an 
irreducible FPP, as Argument D requires, it still can be 
argued that the sources of information available to a suitably 
programmed robot nevertheless enable it to formulate 
intentions when intentions do not also presuppose an 
irreducible FPP. 
Consider the spectacularly successful Mars rovers Spirit 
and Opportunity. Although the larger goal of moving 
from one location to another was provided by mission 
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control, specific routes were determined in situ by 
constructing maps and evaluating plausible routes 
according to obstacles, inclines, etc. Thus the Mars rovers 
were, in a rudimentary sense, gleaning information from 
their environment and using that information to assess 
alternatives so as to plan and execute subsequent actions. 
None of this was done with the requirement of, or pretense 
to having, an irreducible FPP, yet it does come closer to 
fitting the Davidsonian model of intentions. To be sure, this 
is intention-formation of the crudest sort, and it requires 
further argument that propositional attitudes themselves 
are computationally tractable. 
A LARGER POINT: AVOIDING EXCESSES ON
BOTH SIDES 
Baker closes her original article by pointing out that robots’ 
putative inability to form intentions has far-reaching 
implications: 
So machines cannot engage in intentional behavior 
of any kind. For example, they cannot tell lies, since 
lying involves the intent to deceive; they cannot try 
to avoid mistakes, since trying to avoid mistakes 
entails intending to conform to some normative 
rule. They cannot be malevolent, since having
no intentions at all, they can hardly have wicked 
intentions. And, most significantly, computers
cannot use language to make assertions, ask
questions, or make promises, etc., since speech 
acts are but a species of intentional action. Thus, 
we may conclude that a computer can never have a 
will of its own.38 
The challenge for the AI crowd, then, is to break the link 
Baker insists exists between intention formation and an 
irreducible FPP in its robust incarnation. For if Baker is correct 
and the robust FPP presupposes self-consciousness, the 
only way the roboticist can secure machine agency is by 
solving the vastly more difficult problem of consciousness, 
which so far as we presently know is a computationally 
impenetrable problem. I have argued that the link can 
be broken, provided a defensible and computationally 
tractable account of intention is available to replace 
Castaneda’s overly demanding account. 
If my analysis is sound, then there are times when it is 
appropriate for the AI crowd to push back against the mind 
crowd. Yet they must do so in such a way as to respect 
so far as possible the ordinary notions the mind crowd 
expects to see employed. In this case, were the AI crowd to 
so distort the concept of intention in their use of the term 
that it no longer meets the mind crowd’s best expectations, 
the AI crowd would merely have supplied the mind crowd 
with further skeptical arguments. In this sense, the mind 
crowd plays a valuable role in demanding that the AI crowd 
ground their efforts in justifiable conceptual requirements, 
which in no way entails that the AI crowd need accept 
those conceptual requirements without further argument. 
Thus the enterprise of artificial intelligence has as much to 
do with illuminating the efforts of the philosophers of mind 
as the latter have in informing those working in artificial 
intelligence. 
This is a plea by example, then, to the AI crowd that they 
avoid being overly satisfied with themselves simply for 
simulating interesting behaviors, unless of course the point 
of the simulation simply is the behavior. At the same time, 
it is a plea to the mind crowd that they recognize when 
their claims go too far even for human agents and realize 
that the AI crowd is constantly adding to their repertoire 
techniques which can and should inform efforts in the 
philosophy of mind. 
NOTES 
1.	 With apologies to BBC Channel 4’s ”The IT Crowd,” airing 2006– 
2010. 
2.	 Consider John Searle’s article in the February 23, 2011, issue of 
the Wall Street Journal, aptly entitled, ”Watson Doesn’t Know It 
Won on Jeopardy!” 
3.	 L. R. Baker, “Why Computer’s Can’t Act,” American Philosophical 
Quarterly 18 (1981): 157–63. 
4.	 This essay is intended in part to serve as a respectful homage 
to Lynne Rudder Baker, whose patience with unrefined, earnest 
graduate students and unabashed enthusiasm for rigorous 
philosophical inquiry wherever it may lead made her such a 
valued mentor. 
5.	 Baker, “Why Computer’s Can’t Act,” 157. 
6.	 Ibid. 
7.	 H-N. Castaneda, Thinking and Doing: The Philosophical 
Foundations of Institutions (Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Co., 
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(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980). 
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23. Ibid., 86–87. 
24. Ibid., 84–85. 
25.	 D. Davidson, “Thought and Talk,” Inquiries into Truth and 
Interpretation, 155–70 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984). 
26.	 L. R. Baker, “The First-Person Perspective: A Test for Naturalism,”
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LOGIC AND CONSCIOUSNESS 
Consciousness as Process: A New Logical 
Perspective 
Joseph E. Brenner 
INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR THE PHILOSOPHY OF
INFORMATION, JIAOTONG UNIVERSITY, XI’AN, CHINA 
1. INTRODUCTION 
A NEW LOGICAL APPROACH 
I approach the nature of consciousness from a natural 
philosophical-logical standpoint based on a non-linguistic, 
non-truth-functional logic of real processes—Logic in 
Reality (LIR). As I will show, the LIR logic is strongly anti-
propositional and anti-representationalist, and gives 
access to a structural realism that is scientifically as well 
as logically grounded. The elimination I effect is not that 
of the complex properties of human consciousness and 
reasoning but of the chimerical entities that are unnecessary 
to and interfere with beginning to understand it. I point to 
the relation of my logic to personal identity, intuition, and 
anticipation, viewed itself as a complex cognitive process 
that embodies the same logical aspects as other forms of 
cognition. 
A TYPE F MONISM 
In his seminal paper of 2002, David Chalmers analyzed 
several possible conceptions of consciousness based on 
different views of reality.1 Type F Monism “is the view that 
consciousness is constituted by the intrinsic properties 
of fundamental physical entities: that is, by the categorial 
bases of fundamental physical dispositions. On this view, 
phenomenal or proto-phenomenal properties are located 
at the fundamental level of physical reality, and in a certain 
sense, underlie physical reality itself.” Chalmers remarks 
that in contrast to other theories, Type F monism has 
received little critical examination. 
LIR and the theory of consciousness I present in this paper are 
based on the work of Stéphane Lupasco (Bucharest, 1900– 
Paris, 1988). It could be designated as a Type F or Neutral 
Monism2 provided that several changes are introduced into 
the standard definition: a) in complex systems, properties 
have processual as well as static characteristics. Much of 
the discussion about consciousness is otiose because of 
its emphasis on entities, objects, and events rather than 
processes; b) properties and processes, especially of 
complex phenomena like consciousness, are constituted 
by both actual and potential components, and both are 
causally efficient; c) properties do not underlie reality; they 
are reality. The first two points eliminate the attribution of 
panpsychism. This theory allows consciousness-as-process 
to be “hardware,”3 albeit in a different way than nerves 
and computers. FPC is not information processing in the 
standard computationalist sense, since information itself, 
as well as FPC, is conceived of as a process.4 For hardware 
we may also read, for FPC, proper ontological status. 
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2. THE PROBLEM OF LOGIC 
I propose that the principles involved in my extension of 
logic to real phenomena, processes, and systems enable 
many problems of consciousness to be addressed from a 
new perspective. As a non-propositional logic “of and in 
reality,” LIR is grounded in the fundamental dualities of 
the universe and provides a rationale for their operation 
in a dialectical manner at biological, cognitive, and social 
levels of reality. Application of the principles of LIR allows 
us to cut through a number of ongoing debates as to 
the “nature” of consciousness. LIR makes it possible to 
essentially deconstruct the concept of any mental entities— 
including representations, qualia, models and concepts of 
self and free will—that are a substitute for, or an addition 
to, the mental processes themselves. I have accomplished 
this without falling back into an identity theory of mind, 
as described in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.5 
Recent developments in the Philosophy of Information by 
Floridi, Wu, and others support the applicability of LIR to 
consciousness and intelligence.6 
I characterize the science of consciousness today as 
•	 embodying a process ontology and metaphysics, 
following the work of Bickhard and his colleagues. 
•	 integrating the obvious fact that consciousness is 
an emergent phenomenon, and that arguments 
against emergence, such as those of Kim, are 
otiose. 
•	 placing computational models of mind in the 
proper context. 
The brain is massively complex, parallel, and redundant, 
and a synthesis of multiple nested evolutionary processes. 
To further capture many of the essential aspects of 
consciousness, in my view, one still must: 
•	 ground consciousness in fundamental physics, as 
a physical phenomenon; 
•	 define the path from afferent stimuli to the 
conscious mind and the relation between 
conscious and unconscious; 
•	 establish a basis for intentionality and free will 
as the basis for individual moral and responsible 
behavior; 
•	 from a philosophical standpoint, avoid concepts of 
consciousness based on substance metaphysics. 
Valid insights into the functioning of some groups or 
modules of neurons and their relation to consciousness 
have come from the work of Ehresmann using standard 
category theory.7 Standard category and set theories, as 
well as computational models of consciousness, however, 
suffer from the inherent limitations for the discussion of 
complex phenomena imposed by their underlying bivalent 
propositional logics. 
3. PROCESS METAPHYSICS; INTERACTIVISM 
The fundamental metaphysical split between two kinds 
of substances, the factual, non-normative world and the 
mental, normative and largely intensional world, goes 
back to Descartes. In Mark Bickhard’s succinct summary, 
substance metaphysics makes process problematic, 
emergence impossible, and normativity, including 
representational normativity, inexplicable. 
The discussion of nature of consciousness is facilitated 
as soon as one moves from the idea that consciousness 
is a thing or structure, localized or delocalized to some 
sort of process view. This has been demonstrated by 
Mark Bickhard and his associates at Lehigh University in 
Pennsylvania in a paper entitled quite like mine, “Mind as 
Process”8 and subsequently. Arguments can be made9 to 
model causally efficient ontological emergence within a 
process metaphysics that deconstructs the challenges of 
both Kim (metaphysical) and Hume (logical). For example, 
Kim’s view is that all higher level phenomena are causally 
epiphenomenal, and causally efficacious emergence does 
not occur. This argument depends on the assumption that 
fundamental particles participate in organization, but do 
not have organization of their own. The consequence is 
that organization is not a locus of causal power, and the 
emergence assumption that new causal power can emerge 
in new organization would contradict the assumption that 
things that have no organization hold the monopoly of 
causal power. Bickhard’s counter is that particles as such 
do not exist; “everything” is quantum fields; such fields 
are processes; processes are organized; all causal power 
resides in such organizations; and different organizations 
can have different causal powers and consequently also 
novel or emergent causal power. 
Representations have had a major role to play in discussions 
of the nature of consciousness. Interactivism, Bickhard’s 
interactivist model of representation, is a good point to 
start our discussion since it purports to link representation, 
anticipation, and interaction. Anticipatory processes are 
emergent and normative, involving a functional relationship 
between the allegedly autonomous organism and its 
environment. The resulting interactive potentialities have 
truth values for the organism, constituting a minimal model 
of representation. Representation, whose evolutionary 
advantages are easy to demonstrate, is of future potentialities 
for future action or interaction by the organism, and 
Bickhard shows that standard encoding, correspondence, 
isomorphic, and pragmatic views of representation, such as 
that of Drescher, lead to incoherence. The major problem 
with this process view is that it still defines its validity in 
terms of the truth of propositions, without regard to the 
underlying real processes that constitute existence. Further, 
the ontological status of representations can by no means 
be taken for granted, as I will discuss. The interactivist 
movement towards a process ontology is to be welcomed, 
many of its underlying ontological assumptions regarding 
space, time, and causality embody principles of bivalent 
propositional logic or its modal, deontic, or paraconsistent 
versions. Such logics fail to capture critical aspects of real 
change and, accordingly, of emergent complex processes, 
especially consciousness. The extension of logic toward 
real phenomena attempts to do just that. The increase in 
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explanatory power for the characteristics of processes is 
therefore, in this view, a new tool in the effort to develop 
a science of consciousness. It complements systemic 
approaches, computational approaches to anticipation, 
such as those of Daniel Du Bois and the informational 
approaches of Floridi. 
4. LOGIC IN REALITY (LIR) 
The concept of a logic particularly applicable to the science 
and philosophy of consciousness as well as other complex 
cognitive phenomena will be unfamiliar to most readers. I 
will show that this has been due to the restriction of logic 
to propositions or their mathematical equivalents, and an 
alternative form of logic is both possible and necessary. 
Someone to whom I described my physicalist, but non-
materialist theory of consciousness commented, “But 
then mind is just matter knowing itself!” The problem with 
this formulation is that it appears illogical, perhaps even 
unscientific. The logical system I will now propose is a start 
on naturalizing this idea. 
LIR is a new kind of logic, grounded in quantum physics, 
whose axioms and rules provide a framework for analyzing 
and explaining real world processes.10 The term “Logic 
in Reality” (LIR) is intended to imply both 1) that the 
principle of change according to which reality operates 
is a logic embedded in it, the logic in reality; and 2) that 
what logic really is or should be involves this same real 
physical-metaphysical but also logical principle. The major 
components of this logic are the following: 
•	 The foundation in the physical and metaphysical 
dualities of nature 
•	 Its axioms and calculus intended to reflect real 
change 
•	 The categorial structure of its related ontology 
•	 A two-level framework of relational analysis 
DUALITIES 
LIR is based on the quantum mechanics of Planck, Pauli, 
and Heisenberg, and subsequent developments of 
twentieth-century quantum field theory. LIR states that 
the characteristics of energy—extensive and intensive; 
continuous and discontinuous; entropic and negentropic— 
can be formalized as a structural logical principle of 
dynamic opposition, an antagonistic duality inherent in the 
nature of energy (or its effective quantum field equivalent), 
and, accordingly, of all real physical and non-physical 
phenomena—processes, events, theories, etc. The key 
physical and metaphysical dualities are the following: 
•	 Intensity and Extensity in Energy 
•	 Self-Duality of Quantum and Gravitational Fields 
•	 Attraction and Repulsion (Charge, Spin, others) 
•	 Entropy: tendency toward Identity/ Homogeneity 
(2nd Law of Thermodynamics) 
•	 Negentropy: tendency toward Diversity/ 
Heterogeneity (Pauli Exclusion Principle) 
•	 Actuality and Potentiality 
•	 Continuity and Discontinuity 
•	 Internal and External 
The Fundamental Postulate of LIR is that every element e 
always associated with a non-e, such that the actualization 
of one entails the potentialization of the other and vice 
versa, alternatively, without either ever disappearing 
completely. This applies to all complex phenomena, 
since without passage from actuality to potentiality and 
vice versa, no change is possible. Movement is therefore 
toward (asymptotic) non-contradiction of identity or
diversity, or toward contradiction. The midpoint of semi-
actualization and semi-potentialization of both is a point of 
maximum contradiction, a “T-state” resolving contradiction 
(or “counter-action”), from which new entities can emerge. 
Some examples of this are the following: 
•	 Quantum Level: Uncertainty Principle 
•	 Biological Level: Antibody/Antigen Interactions 
•	 Cognitive Level: Conscious/Unconscious
•	 Social Level: Left–Right Swings 
AXIOMS AND CALCULUS
Based on this “antagonistic” worldview, I have proposed 
axioms which “rewrite” the three major axioms of classical 
logic and add three more as required for application to the 
real world: 
LIR1:	 (Physical) Non-Identity: There is no A at a given 
time that is identical to A at another time. 
LIR2:	 Conditional Contradiction: A and non-A both exist 
at the same time, but only in the sense that when 
A is actual, non-A is potential, reciprocally and 
alternatively. 
LIR3:	 Included (Emergent) Middle: An included or 
additional third element or T-state (T for “tiers 
inclus,” included third term) emerges from the 
point of maximum contradiction at which A and 
non-A are equally actualized and potentialized, but 
at a higher level of reality or complexity, at which 
the contradiction is resolved. 
LIR4:	 Logical Elements: The elements of the logic are all 
representations of real physical and non-physical 
entities. 
LIR5:	 Functional Association: Every real logical element 
e—objects, processes, events—is always 
associated, structurally and functionally, with its 
anti-element or contradiction, non-e, without either 
ever disappearing completely; in physics terms, 
they are conjugate variables. This axiom applies 
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to the classical pairs of dualities, e.g., identity and 
diversity. 
LIR6:	 Asymptoticity: No process of actualization or 
potentialization of any element goes to 100 
percent completeness. 
The nature of these real-world elements can be assumed 
to be what are commonly termed “facts” or extra-linguistic 
entities or processes. The logic is a logic of an included
middle, consisting of axioms and rules of inference for 
determining the state of the three dynamic elements 
involved in a phenomenon (“dynamic” in the physical 
sense, related to real rather than to formal change, e.g., of 
conclusions). 
In the notation developed by Lupasco, and as far as I 
know used only by him, where e is any real-world element 
involved in some process of change; ea means that e is 
predominantly actual and implies ēp meaning that non-e is 
predominantly potential; et and ēt mean that e in a T-state
implies non-e in a T-state; and ea means that non-e is 
predominantly actual implying ep, that is, that e is potential. 
In the LIR calculus, the reciprocally determined “reality” 
values of the degree of actualization A, potentialization 
P and T-state T replace the truth values in standard truth 
tables, as summarized in the following notation where 
the symbol T refers exclusively to the T-state, the logical 
included middle defined by Axiom LR3. 
These values have properties similar to non-standard 
probabilities. When there is actualization and 
potentialization of logical elements, their non-contradiction 
is always partial. Contradiction, however, cannot take place 
between two classical terms that are rigorously or totally 
actualized or absolute, that is, where the axiom of non-
contradiction holds absolutely. The consequence is that no 
real element or event can be rigorously non-contradictory; 
it always contains an irreducible quantity of contradiction. 
The semantics of LIR is non-truth-functional. LIR contains 
the logic of the excluded middle as a limiting case, 
approached asymptotically but only instantiated in simple 
situations and abstract contexts, e.g., computational 
aspects of reasoning and mathematical complexity. 
Paraconsistent logics do mirror some of the contradictory 
aspects of real phenomena, as Priest has shown in his 
work on inconsistency in the material sciences. However, 
in LIR the “contradiction” is conditional. In paraconsistent 
logics, propositions are “true” and “false” at the same 
time; in LIR, only in the sense that when one is actual, the 
other is potential. Truth is the truth of reality. I recall here 
Japaridze’s subordination of truth in computability logic as 
a zero-interactivity-order case of computability. 
LIR is a logic applying to processes, in a process-
ontological view of reality, to trends and tendencies, rather 
than to “objects” or the steps in a state-transition picture of 
change. Relatively stable macrophysical objects and simple 
situations are the result of processes of processes going in 
the direction of a “non-contradictory” identity. Starting at the 
quantum level, it is the potentialities as well as actualities 
that are the carriers of the causal properties necessary 
for the emergence of new entities at higher levels. The 
overall theory is thus a metaphysics of energy, and LIR is 
the formal, logical part of that metaphysical theory. LIR is a 
non-arbitrary method for including contradictory elements 
in theories or models whose acceptance would otherwise 
be considered as invalidating them entirely. It is a way to 
“manage” contradiction, a task that is also undertaken by 
paraconsistent, inconsistency-adaptive, and ampliative­
adaptive logics. More relevant Hegelian dialectic logics as 
“precursors” of LIR are reviewed briefly below. 
CATEGORIAL NON-SEPARABILITY IN THE
ONTOLOGY OF LIR 
The third major component of LIR is the categorial 
ontology that fits its axioms. In this ontology, the sole 
material category is Energy, and the most important formal 
category is Dynamic Opposition. From the LIR metaphysical 
standpoint, for real systems or phenomena or processes 
in which real dualities are instantiated, their terms are 
not separated or separable! Real complex phenomena 
display a contradictional relation to or interaction between 
themselves and their opposites or contradictions. On the 
other hand, there are many phenomena in which such 
interactions are not present, and they, and the simple 
changes in which they are involved, can be described by 
classical, binary logic or its modern versions. The most 
useful categorial division that can be made is exactly this: 
phenomena that show non-separability of the terms of the 
dualities as an essential aspect of their existence at their 
level of reality and those that instantiate separability. 
LIR thus approaches in a new way the inevitable problems 
resulting from the classical philosophical dichotomies, 
appearance and reality, as well as the concepts of space, 
time, and causality as categories with separable categorial 
features, including, for example, final and effective cause. 
Non-separability underlies the other metaphysical and 
phenomenal dualities of reality, such as determinism 
and indeterminism, subject and object, continuity and 
discontinuity, and so on. This is a “vital” concept: to 
consider process elements that are contradictorially linked 
as separable is a form of category error. I thus claim that 
non-separability at the macroscopic level, like that being 
explored at the quantum level, provides a principle of 
organization or structure in macroscopic phenomena that 
has been neglected in science and philosophy. 
Stable macrophysical objects and simple situations, 
which can be discussed within binary logic, are the result 
of processes of processes going in the direction of non-
contradiction. Thus, LIR should be seen as a logic applying 
to processes, to trends and tendencies, rather than to 
“objects” or the steps in a state-transition picture of change. 
Despite its application to the extant domain, LIR is neither 
a physics nor a cosmology. It is a logic in the sense of 
enabling stable patterns of inference to be made, albeit 
not with reference to propositional variables. LIR resembles 
inductive and abductive logics in that truth preservation is 
not guaranteed. The elements of LIR are not propositions 
in the usual sense, but probability-like metavariables as in 
quantum logics. Identity and diversity, cause and effect, 
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determinism and indeterminism, and time and space 
receive non-standard interpretations in this theory. 
The principle of dynamic opposition (PDO) in LIR extends 
the meaning of contradiction in paraconsistent logics 
(PCL), defined such that contradiction does not entail 
triviality. LIR captures the logical structure of the dynamics 
involved in the non-separable and inconsistent aspects 
of real phenomena, e.g., of thought, referred to in the 
paraconsistent logic of Graham Priest. LIR thus applies to 
all real dualities, between either classes of entities or two 
individual elements. Examples are theories and the data 
of theories, or facts and meaning, syntax and semantics. 
Others are interactive relations between elements, relations 
between sets or classes of elements, events, etc., and the 
descriptions or explanations of those elements or events. 
LIR does not replace classical binary or multivalued 
logics, including non-monotonic versions, but reduces to 
them for simple systems. These include chaotic systems 
which are not mathematically incomprehensible but also 
computational or algorithmic, as their elements are not in 
an adequately contradictorial interactive relationship. LIR 
permits a differentiation between 1) dynamic systems and 
relations qua the system, which have no form of internal 
representation (e.g., hurricanes), to which binary logic can 
apply; and 2) those which do, such as living systems, for 
which a ternary logic is required. I suggest that the latter 
is the privileged logic of complexity, of consciousness and 
art, of the real mental, social, and political world. 
ORTHO-DIALECTIC CHAINS OF IMPLICATION 
The fundamental postulate of LIR and its formalism can
also be applied to logical operations, answering a potential
objection that the operations themselves would imply or
lead to rigorous non-contradiction. The LIR concept of real
processes is that they are constituted by series of series of
series, etc., of alternating actualizations and potentializations.
However, these series are not finite, for by the Axiom LIR6
of Asymptoticity they never stop totally. However, in reality,
processes do stop, and they are thus not infinite. Following
Lupasco, I will use the term “transfinite” for these series or
chains, which are called ortho- or para-dialectics. 
Every implication implies a contradictory negative 
implication, such that the actualization of one entails 
the potentialization of the other and that the non-
actualization non-potentialization of the one entails the 
non-potentialization non-actualization of the other. This 
leads to a tree-like development of chains of implications. 
This development in chains of chains of implications 
must be finite but unending, that is, transfinite, since 
it is easy to show that if the actualization of implication 
were infinite, one arrives at classical identity (tautology): 
(e ⊃ e). Any phenomenon, insofar as it is empirical or 
diversity or negation, that is, not attached, no matter how 
little, to an identifying implication of some kind, (ē ⊃ e) 
suppresses itself. It is a theorem of LIR that both identity 
and diversity must be present in existence, to the extent 
that they are opposing dynamic aspects of phenomena 
and consequently subject to its axioms. 
STRUCTURAL REALISM 
Some form of structural realism, such as those developed 
by Floridi and Ladyman11 and their respective associates, 
is also required for a logico-philosophical theory of 
consciousness of the kind I will propose. In the Informational 
Structural Realism of Luciano Floridi, the simplest structural 
objects are informational objects, that is, cohering clusters 
of data, not in the alphanumeric sense of the word, but 
in an equally common sense of differences de re, i.e., 
mind-independent, concrete points of lack of uniformity. 
In this approach, a datum can be reduced to just a lack of 
uniformity, that is, a binary difference, like the presence 
and the absence of a black dot, or a change of state, 
from there being no black dot at all to there being one. 
The relation of difference is binary and symmetric, here 
static. The white sheet of paper is not just the necessary 
background condition for the occurrence of a black dot as a 
datum; it is a constitutive part of the datum itself, together 
with the fundamental relation of inequality that couples it 
with the dot. In this specific sense, nothing is a datum per 
se, without its counterpart, just as nobody can be a wife 
without there being a husband. It takes two to make a 
datum. So, ontologically, data (as still unqualified, concrete 
points of lack of uniformity) are purely relational entities. 
Floridi’s informational ontology proposes such partially 
or completely unobservable informational objects at the 
origin of our theories and constructs. Structural objects 
work epistemologically like constraining affordances: 
they allow or invite constructs for the information systems 
like us who elaborate them. Floridi’s ISR is thus primarily 
epistemological, leaving the relation to the energetic 
structure of the universe largely unspecified, even if, 
correctly, the emphasis is shifted from substance to 
relations, patterns and processes. However, it points at this 
level toward the dynamic ontology of LIR in which the data 
are the processes and their opposites or contradictions. 
In the Information-Theoretic Structural Realism of James 
Ladyman and Don Ross and their colleagues, the notion of 
individuals as the primitive constitutents of an ontology is 
replaced by that of real patterns. A real pattern is defined 
as a relational structure between data that is informationally 
projectable, measured by its logical depth, which is a 
normalized quantitative index of the time required to 
generate a model of the pattern by a near-incompressible 
universal computer program, that is, one not itself 
computable as the output of a significantly more concise 
program. In replacing individual objects with patterns, the 
claim that relata are constructed from relations does not 
mean that there are no relata, but that relations are logically 
prior in that the relata of a relation always turn out to be 
relational structures themselves. 
An area of overlap between OSR and LIR is Ladyman’s 
definition of a “pattern” as a carrier of information about 
the real world. A pattern is real iff it is projectable (has an 
information-carrying possibility that can be, in principle, 
computed) and encodes information about a structure of 
events or entities S which is more efficient than the bit­
map encoding of S. More simply: “A pattern is a relation 
between data.” Ladyman’s position is that what exist are 
just real patterns. There are no “things” or hard relata, 
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individual objects as currently understood. It is the real 
patterns that behave like objects, events, or processes 
and the structures of the relations between them are to be 
understood as mathematical models. 
Lupasco’s question “What is a structure?” now appears, 
but the only answer to it is not a set of equations! The 
indirect answer of Ladyman and Ross is in terms of science 
as describing modal structures including unobservable 
instances of properties. What is not of serious ontological 
account are unobservable types of properties. Thus, seeing 
phenomena not as the “result” of the existence of things, 
but their (temporary) stability as part of the world’s modal 
structure, necessity and contingency, is something that 
is acceptable in the LIR framework, provided that the 
dynamic relation of necessity and contingency is also 
accepted. There is information carried by LIR processes 
from one state (of actualization and potentialization) to 
another, describable by some sort of probability-like non-
Kolmogorovian inequalities, although it may not be Turing-
computable. 
DIALECTICAL LOGICS 
Because of the parallels to Hegel’s dialectics, logic, and 
ontology, I have shown in some detail how LIR should be 
differentiated from Hegel’s system.12 Hegel distinguished 
between dialectics and formal logic, which was for him the 
Aristotelian logic of his day. The law of non-contradiction 
holds in formal logic, but it is applicable without modification 
only in the limited domain of the static and changeless. 
In what is generally understood as a dialectical logic, the 
law of non-contradiction fails. Lupasco considered that his 
system included and extended that of Hegel. One cannot 
consider Lupasco a Hegelian or neo-Hegelian without 
specifying the fundamental difference between Hegel’s 
idealism and Lupasco’s realism, which I share. Both Hegel 
and Lupasco started from a vision of the contradictorial or 
antagonistic nature of reality; developed elaborate logical 
systems that dealt with contradiction and went far beyond 
formal propositional logic; and applied these notions to the 
individual and society, consciousness, art, history, ethics, 
and politics.13 
Among more recent (and lesser-known) dialectical logicians, 
I include the Swiss philosopher and mathematician 
Ferdinand Gonseth who discussed the philosophical 
relevance of experience.14 The system of Gonseth has the 
advantage of providing a smooth connection to science 
through mutual reinforcement of theoretical (logical in the 
standard sense), experimental and intuitive perspectives. 
Its “open methodology” refers to openness to experience. 
The interactions implied in Gonseth’s approach can be well 
described in Lupascian terms. In a prophetic insight in 1975, 
in his “open methodology” he described the immersion of 
the individual in “informational processes.” (As it turns out, 
Gonseth was also critical of Lupasco’s system, considering 
it insufficiently rigorous.) More congenial and very much 
in the spirit of Lupasco was the work of the Marxian Evald 
Ilyenkov.15 In a section entitled “The Materialist Conception 
of Thought as the Subject Matter of Logic,” Ilyenkov wrote, 
“At first hand, the transformation of the material into the 
ideal consists in the external first being expressed in 
language, which is the immediate actuality of thought 
(Marx). But language itself is as little ideal as the neuro­
physiological structure of the brain. It is only the form of 
expression (JEB: dynamic form) of the ideal, its material-
objective being.” 
NON-DUALISM 
Non-dualism attempts to relate key insights of Eastern 
Asian thought to Western thought about life and mind. it 
establishes a “working” relationship between opposites. 
Eastern and Western thought processes have been 
discussed in a series of compendia to which I have 
contributed.16 Non-dualism has been criticized as being 
non-scientific, perhaps for the wrong reasons, but Logic in 
Reality can be considered a “non-standard” non-dualism in 
that it recognizes the existence of the familiar physical and 
meta-physical dualities. However, the additional interactive, 
oppositional feature it ascribes to them as a logic avoids 
introducing a further unnecessary duality between it and 
Eastern non-dualism. Let us now turn to the Lupasco theory 
of consciousness as such. 
5. THE LIR THEORY OF CONSCIOUSNESS 
As Lupasco proposed in the mid-twentieth century, 
the opportunity and the possibility of characterizing 
consciousness as a complex process, or set of processes, 
arise from consideration of the details of perception and 
action.17 Such consideration allows one to include, from 
the beginning, a complementary structure of processes 
that corresponds to what is loosely referred to as the 
unconscious, to the relation between the conscious and 
the unconscious, and to the emergence of a second order 
consciousness of consciousness. Higher level cognitive 
functions are perhaps easier to characterize as processes 
than “having consciousness,” but consciousness of 
consciousness is active enough. It remains to demonstrate 
the evidence for their also resulting from contradictorial 
interactions of the kind described as fundamental in LIR. 
The analysis of the processes of consciousness in LIR starts 
with that of the initial reception of external stimuli and the 
consequent successive alternations of actualization and 
potentialization leading to complex sequences of T-states, 
as follows: 
•	 An initial internal state of excitation, involving 
afferent stimuli. 
•	 An internal/external (subject-object) state in which 
afferent and efferent (motor) mechanisms interact. 
•	 The above states interacting in the brain to produce 
higher level T-states: ideas, images, and concepts. 
•	 Further interactions leading to consciousness and 
unconsciousness (the unconscious) as T-states, 
memory, and forgetting. 
•	 At the highest level, the emergence of 
consciousness of consciousness, knowledge, 
intuition, and overall psychic structure. 
The originality of this picture does not reside in its 
identification of a consciousness, a consciousness of 
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consciousness (sometimes designated as awareness), 
and an unconscious. Rather, it is in its emphasis on the 
logical origin of these higher-level dynamic structures 
in a principle of opposition at the level of basic physics 
that provides the mechanism for their emergence and 
the subsequent complexification of their interactions. 
Thus, it can be shown that there are, in addition and as a 
consequence, three (types of) the other mental processes 
of memory, forgetting, imagination, and creativity. Only via 
a system complex enough to incorporate these aspects 
might one be able to arrive at a meaningful, real dynamics 
of consciousness.
To try to disentangle the various issues involved in 
consciousness and cognition, I therefore will first position 
some of the entities involved in this picture of consciousness 
in the key categories of the ontology of LIR: 
•	 Energy: light; thermal, chemical, and 
electrochemical gradients; 
•	 Process: chemical and ion flows; chemical 
synthesis; structural changes of molecules; actions 
and behavior; remembering and forgetting; 
•	 Dynamic Opposition: activation/excitation and 
passivation/inhibition; 
•	 Subject and Object: the phenomenological 
subject-object; 
•	 T-states and Emergence: control states; feelings; 
concepts; ideas. 
THE DIALECTICS OF AFFERENT AND EFFERENT
SYSTEMS 
The next step is to look in more detail at the dialectics, in 
human perception, of afferent nerve impulses moving from 
peripheral receptors toward the central nervous system 
and efferent impulses moving toward the peripheral, 
especially, motor systems. Prior to excitation by internal 
or external stimuli, let us assume that the afferent 
system is in a state of potentiality, maintained by the 
antagonistic actualization of the polarization or electrostatic 
equilibrium.18 Excitation results in a new actualization, 
potentializing the ionic equilibrium, the reception of an 
equivalent to a heterogeneity of sensations. The new 
equilibrium state of perception appears, in its homogeneity, 
as something objective, exterior, an identity of which one 
can have “knowledge,” while sensations, although really 
belonging to the external world, appear interior to the 
senses and more subjective. The dialectics established in 
and by the afferent process is, accordingly, between the 
conscious mind, the “knower” as such, actualizing a series 
of energetic heterogeneities, and the “known” displaced to 
the exterior, in the potentiality of energetic homogeneity. 
This conception could be called “pan-energetics,” but it 
is not a pan-psychism; the mind appears as an aspect of 
the structuring and functioning of energy itself, like the 
physical and biological, but admittedly the most complex 
one. 
Following re-equilibration (re-polarization) of the excited 
nerve cells in a T-state, efferent stimuli leave the brain in 
the direction of organs of movement (of course, with the 
possibility of many intermediate feedback loops), with 
a dialectics that is the inverse of the afferent system. 
Its actualization looks like a plan, an operation of active 
structural homogenization, which will be opposed by the 
heterogeneity of the external world in which it will operate, 
and the dialectics involve thus the imposition of this plan 
on the external world, and the potentialization of this 
heterogeneity. There is thus a dialectic of the contradictory 
and antagonistic dialectics of perception and action, which 
implies, since one does not exist without the other, that 
each succeeds the other, but neither is very far, in the 
nervous system, from the T-state. The difference between 
actualizations that potentialize and potentializations that 
actualize is not continuous, and the pauses in the process, 
in the T-state, are what can be considered states of control. 
These constitute the dialectic of the psyche itself, which 
becomes what is generally called consciousness.
CONSCIOUSNESS AND UNCONSCIOUSNESS AND
THEIR DIALECTICS 
The next step in the explanation is to identify what appears 
in the most primitive consciousness as the objects capable 
of satisfying physiological and biological needs—food, the 
sexual partner—in potential form, through the actualization 
of the biochemical phenomena of those needs. The 
consciousness of hunger is not the consciousness of an 
alimentary need, but is the need in a potential state. The 
actualization of this need projects, by antagonism and 
contradiction, the missing objects into potentiality, and 
it is this potentiality that is or constitutes consciousness. 
In other words, the same concept of parallelism is to be 
rejected here as in the case of energy itself: not here 
energy and there its properties, intensity and extensity. 
The needs, the operations of biological satisfaction are not 
on one side and the consciousness of those needs on the 
other mediated by some enigmatic entity, leading to the 
common, but misleading expression “consciousness of.” 
There is, in the LIR theory, no such “consciousness of,” no 
reification or objectification, only that which occupies the 
conscious mind, that which is potentiality itself is what is 
commonly called consciousness. 
A potentiality is a conscious energetic state that contains 
that which will be actualized, the need, and its opposite, 
the lack of which is the need, and is unconscious. 
However, in contrast to standard theories of mind, there 
is no actualized structure corresponding to the conscious 
mental state: it is delocalized potentialities. When the lack 
(hunger) is replaced by the sensation of satiety, the missing 
elements (food) are eliminated from consciousness and 
replaced by the potentiality of satiety, which in turn creates 
a consciousness of satiety and rejection of operations 
leading to food intake. 
What it is actualized, then, does not disappear totally 
but disappears into the unconscious mind. The next step 
is to see that there were present, on the one hand, the 
consciousness of the need and what the need required 
for its actualization and the unconsciousness of the lack 
PAGE 16	 FALL 2018  | VOLUME 18  | NUMBER 1 
APA NEWSLETTER  |  PHILOSOPHY AND COMPUTERS
 
of this requirement, and on the other hand, consciousness 
of the satisfaction by the actualization and consequently 
unconsciousness of the disappearance of the lack. Thus, 
there are two consciousnesses and two un-consciousnesses 
that alternate. There is a constant dialectical movement 
between what occupies and is consciousness and that, 
which, by its actualization, leaves the domain of potentiality 
and “falls” into the unconscious. But, as always, these 
moves are never total; there is always some potentiality or 
relative consciousness in unconsciousness and vice versa. 
The extent of movement into the unconscious is normally 
inversely proportional to the importance of the event. After 
locking my car, I will in general not find it necessary to 
remember that I locked it, but there is always a probability 
of the belief that I did not lock it. If this is actualized, I will 
go back and check it unless I remember enough of the 
diffuse (diverse) circumstances at the time of my locking 
to convince me I did so. The dualism in consciousness can 
be captured in the example of perception of an object, say, 
a chair, which shows at the same time how the concepts 
of internal and external can be understood. When one is 
conscious that something is a chair, one says that one is 
conscious of it, rather than of its detailed form and color. 
In this view, I “am” the chair in a potential state; it is the 
potentiality of the chair qua chair that is the content of 
my consciousness of the chair, that is, consciousness 
itself. But the identity, permanence, and so on of the 
chair are also actual, although I am unconscious of them. 
Everything happens as if the chair were my representation 
of it and at the same time external to me. There is double 
consciousness and double unconsciousness, of an external 
world as if made up of objects, that is, of identities, whose 
location is my consciousness, and an external world of 
sensations, actualizations of my sense organs, which, 
as actualizations, disappear into my unconscious. My 
consciousness is polarized by the object of perception, 
but this object is only potentialized relative to my senses. 
The key difference between this description of external 
and internal reality is in the relation of the internal 
representation with the potentiality that appears in the 
perception of the object, “of the chair, of this chair, in back 
of the heterogeneous actualizations of my senses, my 
receptors and brain centers, contradictorially associated 
with the chair, with this chair.” (These are the examples 
essentially as presented by Lupasco in reference 27.) This 
consequently permits the elaboration of a complex system 
of two consciousnesses of homogeneity and two sub­
consciousnesses of heterogeneity, one of each stronger 
and the other weaker, succeeding one another dialectically. 
Table 4.2 illustrates this. 
Table 4.2 
Stronger Weaker 
Consciousness (of Object of perception Afferent 
homogeneity of) (potential) stimuli 
Subconsciousness (of Afferent stimuli (actual) Object 
homogeneity(ies) of 
perception) 
The two inverse dialectics, of consciousness and sub-
or un-consciousness, are themselves antagonistic and 
contradictory, involved in a dialectic, succeeding, interfering, 
and dependent on one another, with the result that there 
exist, in a waking state, no less than eight mental structures, 
four consciousnesses and four subconsciousnesses, with 
different gradients of homogeneity and heterogeneity. 
CONSCIOUSNESS OF CONSCIOUSNESS 
I suggest, as have many others, that what distinguishes 
individual human awareness from animal or primitive 
consciousness is consciousness of consciousness. The best-
known formulation of self-awareness is Descartes’s cogito, 
ergo sum. Descartes also said, “we cannot doubt of our 
existence while we doubt,” but Lupasco emphasized that it 
is through doubting that one becomes conscious of thought 
and therefore conscious of one’s consciousness. Lupasco 
said, specifically, dubito ergo sum. Doubting implies 
being aware of oneself as the locus of the contradictory 
consciousnesses referred to above, and of their T-states 
of the semi-actualization and semi-potentialization of 
each, which also includes the corresponding processes 
in the subconscious. One then possesses, in effect, two 
consciousnesses, each of which is aware of the other, of 
their contradiction, of their antagonism and accordingly of 
themselves, through a consciousness of consciousness, 
via an internal dialectics of control. (Such a control state 
is, admittedly, an hypothesis; no control state has been 
identified, although it may be implied by recent work on 
latency and response times.) This dialectic of dialectics 
is thus at the same time a dialectic of consciousness of 
consciousness and consciousness of subconsciousness, 
and constitutes what is generally called the mind or psyche 
as such. 
The “sequence” of events in consciousness in this picture 
is the following: 
Level 1: When a set of perceptions is actualized by the 
afferent system, two things happen: the heterogeneous 
actualizations as such, which constitute a primitive 
subject, without self-awareness, disappear into an 
unconscious (or subconscious, SC1A). The corresponding 
potentializations constitute a primitive consciousness 
C1A, also lacking self-awareness, in which the perceptions 
appear as largely homogenous objects, OA. When a set 
of actions is initiated by the efferent system, the related, 
actualized homogeneous plan of action becomes another 
subconscious (SC1E), and its heterogeneous objects OE 
constitute another consciousness C1E. At this level, the 
resting state of equilibrium in the absence of afferent and 
efferent influx is defined as a T-state of control (see above). 
Level 2: Self-awareness develops out of the dynamic 
opposition between the above two consciousnesses C1A 
and C1E, at the point of equilibrium of semi-actualization 
and semi-potentialization of each, producing, always as 
an energetic pattern, a T-state which is a consciousness 
of consciousness. Interaction of the latter with the 
unconscious or sub-consciousnesses SC1A and SC1E result 
in a consciousness of sub-consciousness. 
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Level 3: The two dynamically opposed general subjects 
of Level 1, SA and SE, and the corresponding general 
objects OA and OE are not isolated entities, but overlap 
and interact. At Level 2, via the corresponding semi-
actualizations and semi-potentializations, a consciousness 
of the consciousness of the subject and object will 
develop as well as the corresponding consciousness 
of the unconsciousness of subject and object. Out of 
these and their related dynamic oppositions develop 
the higher functions of images, concepts, and creativity. 
Memories are present as delocalized potential events in 
the consciousness of consciousness and as re-actualized 
events in the consciousness of subconsciousness. 
A key property of the interactions that I have described as 
obtaining between a real mental element and its opposite or 
contradiction, and between both and any emergent included 
middle (T-state) is bidirectionality. Since all elements, 
conscious or sub-conscious, are present in the same 
configuration space-time, the LIR picture of the reciprocity 
between A and non-A, A potentializing non-A followed by 
non-A potentializing A is a description of a bidirectional 
process. In the two-level LIR framework, the two elements 
may be at different levels. This picture finds support in the 
apparent irreducibility of sub-conscious psychophysical 
computation to neuronal brain activation. Bentwich has 
found that while most models of brain computational 
processes propose that neurochemical activity causes 
cognitive, behavioral, or physiological processes (PCP), 
the opposite does not take place.19 In one case, he shows 
that this assumption results in a contradiction. This leads 
to the conclusion that PCP takes place at another (higher) 
computational level that is not reducible to the lower 
neural level and has received the term “Duality Principle.” 
Bentwich suggests that the Duality Principle may apply to 
other brain-related computational processing. Although I 
criticize some aspects of computational models in relation 
to intentionality, this work fits closely the dynamics that I 
propose between the potentialized elements in the brain 
and the actualized, observable ones at the neuronal level. A 
duality principle of this kind should be a preferred heuristic. 
For comparison with the LIR system, Table 4.3 lists the four 
types of consciousness defined by Daniel Dubois in 1990.20 
Although there are a number of differences with the LIR 
view of consciousness, I fully agree with Dubois’s statement 
that global consciousness is constituted by interactive 
loops between the different types of consciousnesses. The 
LIR types are differentiated according to the ontological 
features of identity and diversity, and development from 
the systems of perception or action, rather than a left-
right brain division. The other difference is that in LIR, one 
is never fully conscious of acts, and there is no separate 
self to be conscious of either. At this point, I can only say 
that the LIR view is not incompatible with non-reductionist 
informational approaches to the fundamental information 
processing components of brain function such as those 
of Pedro Marijuan.21 The “topodynamic” duality principles 
leading to minimization of the ratios of excitation to inhibition 
allows for continuity between the nervous system, the 
cellular signaling system, and consciousness. To conclude 
this rapid overview, it is clear that only a phenomenological 
differentiation, at least as complex as that which Dubois 
and I have described, will enable a potential relation of 
consciousness to the underlying neuroscience to be made. 
Table 4.3 
Primary Localization: Primary Localization:
Left Hemisphere Right Hemisphere 
Objective Psychological Subjective Psychological 
Consciousness Consciousness 
Consciousness of Acts Consciousness of Self 
Meta-Consciousness = Meta-Self-Consciousness = 
Consciousness of Self-Consciousness of Self-
Consciousness = Consciousness 
Conscious Consciousness 
Unconsciousness = 
Unconscious Consciousness 
MEMORY AND FORGETTING 
No theory of consciousness is complete or acceptable 
unless it accounts for memory, images, concepts, 
qualia, intentionality, and creativity, and I will just make 
a few comments here on the LIR view of memory. The 
contradictorial picture of the processual interactions, in the 
brain, of macrophysical, biological, and neuro-psychical 
systems provides the basis for a new explication of 
memory, in which a distinction is made between conscious 
“information” or remembrance (souvenir) consciously 
present and memory-as-such. In the LIR point of view, 
memory is not a receptacle, a box containing past events 
in potential form, and the souvenir their actualization, 
which springs up all at once for one reason or another into 
consciousness. Memory is the actuality and actualization 
themselves, albeit, as actualizations, in the unconscious. 
The souvenir, on the other hand, is the potential event 
as it emerges in consciousness, occupies, and creates 
it. Memory and souvenir are thus also antagonistic and 
contradictory to one another. 
In the LIR picture, like that of Bergson, one is subject to 
the constant interference and antagonism, a dialectics of 
dialectics of memory and souvenir in opposition, of the two 
physical (mechanical) and biological (organic) memories 
that correspond to the chemical and neurophysiological 
constitutents of the brain plus a third cognitive memory, 
constituted by the consciousness of sub-consciousness 
and consciousness of consciousness in a T-state, an 
emergent included middle. This third memory is equivalent 
to self-awareness, a memory “that knows it is a memory.” 
It is not to be found as an actualized structure but as an 
incessant internal contradictorial process, greatest when 
afferent and efferent operations are cut off from external, 
relatively non-contradictory contacts. 
A forgetting is also a neuro-energetic process activity that 
prevents an actualization in the unconscious or a semi-
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actualization in the subconscious from potentializing itself, 
that is, emerging at the level of consciousness, becoming 
conscious. There are, accordingly, three forgettings, one 
for each of the three kinds of memories: the forgetting of 
identities, actualized by unconscious homogenizing forces; 
the forgetting of variations and diversities actualized by 
unconscious heterogenizing forces; and a third forgetting 
at the same time of the identities and diversities in 
the subconscious, even though the relevant force of 
actualization is only a semi-actualization in the T-state. As 
noted below in the section on creativity, it is from this third 
memory and its corresponding forgetting that emerge 
discoveries and inventions, all the riches of the creative 
imagination, all the new combinations of images, concepts, 
and ideas. 
Mechanistic biology looks for a precise location, a fully 
actual location for memory. Edelman’s neural network 
picture is one of many possible examples from current 
neuroscience and cognitive science. One general problem 
with this picture is the well-known turnover of brain 
structure at the molecular level; something different 
must be maintaining the relative stability of the memory, 
and I see this as explained by the LIR conception of the 
persistence of non-localized but also potential properties 
of the physico-chemical brain structures themselves and of 
the higher levels built up from them, as suggested above.
THE BENNETT AND HACKER VIEW OF
CONSCIOUSNESS 
The Lupasco logic of real processes allows an interpretation 
of many of the criteria proposed by Bennett and Hacker for 
a theory of consciousness, without getting into the details 
of their neurological model.22 Bennett and Hacker focus 
on the human being as a psychophysical unity, without 
attributing thought or knowing to the brain or its parts, 
such as its hemispheres. The following summarizes where 
I have found their approach useful: 
•	 Mind and Self 
The self, defined as something that is identical with 
me, as something I have or as something in me is 
an aberration. There is no such thing, and “I” does 
not refer to an “Ego” owned by me. One has, as 
arguments, the formal one from infinite regress and the 
phenomenological one from our existence as human 
beings, not brains or minds. There is no such thing as 
my perceiving, rather than having, my own thoughts. 
The LIR appearance/reality dialectics is useful here. 
The mind is not an entity or a thing or a “domain”; this 
term refers idiomatically to a wide range of human 
powers and their exercise. 
•	 Representation 
In this view, it is a mistake to say that what we or 
some “mind” perceive is an image or representation 
of an object, or that perception involves having an 
image of the object. The so-called binding problem 
is a false problem, since the brain does not construct 
a perceived world, but enables an animal to see a 
visible scene. Damasio was mistaken in his distinction 
between having and feeling an emotion, as if emotions 
were some sort of somatic image or marker. 
•	 Qualia 
The term of “qualia” was introduced to signify the 
alleged private character of experience, its phenomenal 
qualities, or qualia for short. This led to Nagel’s 
strategy of explaining the subjective or qualitative 
feel of experience in terms of their being something 
it is like to have it. However, as Bennett and Hacker 
show, neuroscientists such as Damasio and Edelman 
shift the sense of the term “quale” from the qualitative 
character of experience to the qualitative character of 
objects. The term “quale” equivocates between what 
it is like to have an experience and the experience 
itself. The indexical approach clarifies the problem, 
although in the LIR conception of human psychological 
types, it will never convince everybody. The question 
“Why is seeing red like seeing this (Wittgensteinian 
pointing to a sample) is misguided because seeing 
red does not resemble seeing this, it is seeing this. 
The alleged incommunicability of the subjective 
qualities of an experience is confused. One cannot 
describe a quality in the same way as one describes an 
object by specifying its qualities; what one needs is a 
better vocabulary. A description is not a substitute for 
experience.
There are two points where one can criticize the Bennett 
and Hacker approach: (1) I agree that to perceive is not to 
form a hypothesis or make an inference, but I disagree that 
inferences are not mental processes, but transformations 
of propositions in accordance with a rule. LIR extends 
inference to process. (2) The authors say correctly that it is 
the task of neuroscience to investigate empirical nature of 
consciousness, while that of philosophy is to elucidate its 
defining its concepts and connections with related ones such 
as anticipation, thought, and so on. They also say, however, 
that philosophy can contribute nothing to the scientific 
theories about the neural basis of consciousness, although 
the two activities are complementary, not competitive or 
mutually exclusive. Perhaps standard philosophy cannot, 
but I submit that the logic and metaphysics of LIR cannot 
be separated from science; complementarity implies 
interaction, and the concepts of LIR are thus pertinent to a 
science of consciousness. 
Intransitive consciousness is a condition for various 
forms of occurrent transitive consciousness—that is, for 
being conscious of something at a given time. Transitive 
consciousness is a form of knowledge, or, preferably, 
knowing. Above all, what one is perceptually conscious of 
is not something over and above some of the things one 
perceives. One is conscious of what occupies one’s mind 
at a particular time, and Lupasco emphasized the dynamics 
of change from conscious to unconscious as one from 
(primarily) actual to (primarily) potential. 
Bennett and Hacker urge us to avoid taking “mysterian”
positions that start by trying to see First Person
Consciousness as outside nature. It is the richness of
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cognitive processes in human beings that are the logical
criteria for a creature’s being conscious. “Cognitive
neuroscience operates across a categorial ‘divide’ between 
the psychological and the neural (which is a particular 
case of the physical). There is nothing mysterious about 
this divide.” It is constituted by the logico-grammatical 
differences as well as the connections between the 
characteristic concepts of neuroscience and those of 
psychology. “Cognitive science has constantly to cross this 
logical divide.” This is ample justification, in my mind, for a 
reworking of the underlying logic. 
6. REVISITING SOME KEY QUESTIONS 
THE MAJOR APPROACHES OF COGNITIVE
SCIENCE. REPRESENTATIONALISM 
The major, related approaches of cognitive science to the 
phenomenological data of consciousness are as follows: 
•	 Representationalism, according to which internal 
mental entities stand for or correspond to real 
external properties and events. Representationalism 
includes the next two approaches, in which the 
entities involved are the symbols and properties, 
respectively. 
•	 Computationalism, the view that thinking is 
basically a form of computation in the sense of 
computer science, an algorithmically determined 
process of manipulation of symbols in a neural 
network; 
•	 Connectionism, which sees cognitive function as 
the operation of the system of neural networks, not 
with isolated symbols, but with vector distributions 
of properties according to a dynamical model and 
following rules for non-linear dynamic systems. 
•	 Functionalism, of which computationalism is a 
variety, the view that thinking is wholly defined by 
its function in a physical system as it interacts with 
other internal and external processes. 
These approaches, alone or in various combinations, 
all seem to me to have one or more of the following 
weaknesses and, accordingly, are fair targets for debate: 
1.	 Reification of consciousness, neglecting its 
process aspects, equivalent to a classical substance 
ontology; 
2.	 Reference to actual entities to the exclusion of 
potential ones; 
3.	 Functional separation of external and internal 
aspects of consciousness, despite reference, as 
in discussions of biological phenomena, to the 
environment; 
4.	 Absence of adequate complexification of 
conscious and unconscious processes, suggested 
by the Lupasco scheme above. 
The “Working Hypothesis of Neurophenomenology” is that 
phenomenological accounts of the structure of experience 
(or structured phenomenological accounts of experience) 
and their counterparts in cognitive science relate to each 
other through reciprocal constraints.23 
Although from my point of view these authors’ attempts 
to find a specific locus for the bridge between the two 
domains were unsuccessful, the concept that the mutual 
constraints would need to be operationally generative, 
that is, directly link “appearances” to specific emergent 
biological processes, points directly toward the positions 
of what I have called Logic in Reality (LIR). LIR is a way 
of joining, to use the term used by Roy et al., both the 
two types of data separated by a “wavy line” at a level of 
description that is sufficiently general, rather than abstract, 
to provide for functional interactions between the elements 
on both sides of the line. 
If one assumes, on the other hand, as in the computational 
form of representationalism, that there is a symbolic entity 
between neurobiological and phenomenological data, a 
host of secondary problems arise as to the properties and 
relations of the symbols involved. In representationalist 
theories, internal entities of some sort stand for or 
correspond in some way to external processes and events. 
These mental representations explain or are explanatory 
devices for cognition in that they are, or correspond to 
(this vagueness is typical) intentional states, instances of 
intentionality considered as embodying the irreducible 
first-person properties that are alleged to characterize 
consciousness, reasoning, and qualia. This account of 
mental processes suffers from the need to introduce 
additional entities due to the lack of a principled categorial 
method of relating its critical concepts contradictorially. 
LIR on the other hand supports not only the “truth” of 
first-person consciousness24 but its ontological existence. 
A mental phenomenon is not something other than the 
physical processes with emergent properties. It only 
“displays” its contradictorial origins in appearing to have 
symbolic and non-symbolic aspects, and being closer or 
farther from the center of attention at a particular time. 
My approach is thus fundamentally anti-representationalist, 
bringing it into conflict with the semiotics of Peirce and his 
current followers, especially Sören Brier. I have proposed 
LIR as an ontological substitute for Peirce’s theory of signs 
both in the field of information and more generally.25 Very 
rapidly, I conclude that signs are both 1) ontologically 
dependent on the phenomena of which they are the signs 
and 2) incapable of reflecting the dynamic and value-laden 
interactions involved in real phenomena, such as personal 
identity. 
PERSONAL IDENTITY 
For human beings, the concepts of consciousness and 
personal identity are inextricably linked. I have described 
the LIR view of consciousness of consciousness, and I can 
now claim that recent philosophical work by Dan Kolak 
supports this picture, especially as regards the origin of 
individual and collective responsibility. The characterization 
of personal identity is thus a key issue for science as well 
as philosophy. The logical perspective of LIR, which sees 
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identity also as a process of identification, accompanied 
by its opposite, permits a naturalization of concepts of 
personal identity such as that of Kolak. LIR can be seen 
as a bridge between philosophy and science that places 
this view in logic and therefore in science and society. 
The picture that emerges from this analysis is an ethical 
one. It supports and explicates another of the insights of 
Dan Kolak in his major book, I am You; The Metaphysical 
Foundations for Global Ethics.26 
In the June 2008 volume of Synthese dedicated to 
the subject of personal identity, Kolak wrote that “(a) 
consciousness makes personal identity and (b) in 
consciousness alone personal identity exists.” His analysis 
of public vs. first-person perspectives, using cases from 
neuropsychiatry, provides the scientific, mathematical, and 
logical frameworks for what he calls a new theory of self-
reference wherein consciousness, self-consciousness, and 
the “I” are precisely defined in terms, close to Sartre, of 
the subject and the subject-in-itself. In Kolak’s approach, 
the critical move is to avoid a separation of the subject that 
is the bearer of personal identity from its psychological 
object identifications. LIR supports the argument by 
providing the rules for the relative, alternating dominance 
of the two perspectives: personal identity and the intuition 
of personal identity, the reality of subject-dependence and 
the appearance of subject-independence of experience are 
dynamically, dialectically related in the LIR logic. Logical, 
psychological, and metaphysical perspectives intersect 
in this view. In LIR terms, Kolak’s statement that one’s 
essential subjectivity is obscured by the intuition of one’s 
own existence and identity is that the former is potentialized 
by the latter. The conjoined personality experience by the 
subject from the inside as the identified self that expresses 
itself as “I am I,” not my brain, not my body, and not even 
my “self.” LIR thus allows a principled ontological process 
view of consciousness. It is constituted by systems of 
systems of past and present mental processes following the 
LIR dynamics of alternating actualization an potentialization 
from which personal identity is constituted as an emergent 
structure. LIR offers no explanation of why I am this I and 
you are another one, but nobody has yet done so, as far as 
I know. 
KNOWLEDGE AND INTUITION 
As Kolak states, the above line of reasoning gives a 
privileged status to the role, function, and nature of intuition. 
I would like to expand on it to illustrate the application 
of LIR to one of the controversial functional properties 
of human consciousness. The problem is that there has 
been no obvious way to make an absolute differentiation 
between knowledge, or knowledge-as-such, and intuition 
as regards how they arise and their respective functions as 
protagonists in the drama of knowledge. Let us postulate 
that knowledge-as-such and intuition or intuitive knowledge 
are indeed two forms of knowledge or better knowing. 
Actualization and potentialization constitute, at the same 
time, the mechanisms of both knowledge and existence 
(logical becoming), both involving alternation between 
states in which one term is (almost) fully actualized and 
then the other is (almost) fully potentialized. Then, as stated 
by Lupasco in his State Thesis of 1935, given any cognitive 
process, a logical becoming is involved since knowing 
means inhibiting one antagonistic factor by another. The 
knowledge associated with the strongly actualized terms 
is the identifying knowledge-as-such, the major content 
of consciousness. The statistical process of oscillation 
“leaves behind,” however, a minor, accidental knowledge 
or known that can be designated as intuition. Intuition is 
thus an embryonic non-identity, always an unexpected and 
brief “irrational” invasion of consciousness, discontinuous, 
without a direct relation to it. In terms of cognitive power, 
the difference between intuition and knowledge as such 
is only one of degree, and their relation can be described 
by saying that what is given intuitively is the inverse of 
what is given to knowledge; the content of knowledge is 
contradictory in the sense of being dynamically opposed 
to the content of intuition, and the existentiality of one is 
a function of that of the other. Intuition in this dynamic 
aspect must be seen as a logical process, subject to the 
rules of LIR applied to knowledge. I claim that both types of 
intuition, sensible and intellectual, are direct experiences, 
actions, or processes and have a place in a theory of 
mind. From the point of view of difference in function, 
what is primarily retained in the conscious mind is a kind 
of identity and synthetic rationality, and what constitutes 
intuition is the knowledge of movement, time, intensity, 
the heterogeneous, etc. Thus, one does not “see” change 
itself, but rather one identity replacing another. Change is 
“felt,” i.e., known intuitively. Other functional examples that 
can be developed are those of intellectual consciousness 
vs. active consciousness, the first the consequence of 
vital becoming, where science dominates and intuition is 
avoided; the second of material becoming and “action,” in 
which intuition is essential and the role of formal knowledge 
is reduced. 
The position taken by Levy regarding the distinction between 
knowledge-that and knowledge-how supports my anti-
propositional view of logic in real processes in general.27 
The argument is succinct: knowledge-how requires both 
propositional knowledge and motor representations in the 
mind. But motor representations are not mere dispositions 
to behavior; they have some representational content. Since 
that content is not propositional, propositional knowledge 
is not sufficient for knowledge-how. Neither propositions 
nor representations are required in the LIR approach: if 
motor representations play a central role in realizing the 
intelligence in knowledge-how, or more simply, are a form 
of knowledge hence of consciousness, the concept of a 
representation as a separate entity can be replaced by that 
of process. 
ANTICIPATION 
Anticipation is primarily a property of conscious living 
systems. That anticipation can play a role in systems that 
involve substantial abstract modeling rather than self-
representation at their level of reality is simply another case, 
in my view, of the projection of aspects of the real world, 
reality, into a configuration space of lower dimensionality. 
The clearest example of this notion is to be found in the work 
of Gödel. The Gödel theorems and logic—as written—do 
not apply to physical or mental emergent phenomena, but 
LIR views the principle involved, the duality of consistency 
and completeness, axiomatically, as another instantiation 
of the fundamental duality of the universe. Gödel rejected, 
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correctly in my view, the more idealist implications of 
many-world pictures of reality, but did not make the 
extension of his own ideas to it. The logical and ontological 
development undertaken in LIR provides a bridge between 
prior definitions of the principle of dynamic opposition 
and Gödelian dualism and illuminates Gödelian dualism as 
another expression of the fundamental dynamic opposition 
at the heart of energy and phenomena. 
I have argued that potential states and processes, of which 
consciousness is an example, are causally effective and not 
epiphenomenal. If this is accepted, then the naturalization 
of anticipation follows logically, at least in my logic. One 
needs to differentiate, however, between anticipation 
in living beings and anticipation in machines, or, rather, 
between anticipatory systems that are and are not 
computable. I, in fact, assimilate anticipation at the cognitive 
level to particularly well-formed, homogeneous potential 
states that are opposed to the general fuzziness of the 
“stream of consciousness.” I differ with Dubois, however, 
in that I do not assign a separate subjective or objective 
character to anticipation or to a particular hemisphere to 
the exclusion of the other. I believe it is important to focus 
on all high-level properties as properties of the whole 
human being, of whom the alleged parts are convenient 
abstractions for analysis. I am thus not saying that there 
are some anticipatory systems that are not computable, 
with which I am sure we can all agree. I am saying that 
conscious anticipation is not fully computable. What 
distinguishes anticipatory processes is a higher degree of 
potentiality, but anticipation does not define all processes. 
Anticipatory processes are thus a sub-class of a broader 
group of processes that constitute “consciousness.” 
My key difference with Dubois can be summarized as 
follows: 
•	 Dubois: anticipation is the potential future value of 
a system’s variables 
•	 LIR: anticipation is the current potential value of 
some systems’ variables 
Dubois has criticized Rosen’s concept of anticipation as 
“quasi-anticipation” as failing to account for feedback. The 
LIR model does not require full predictability. Nevertheless, 
I am sympathetic with Rosen’s intuitions about life in 
general, expressed in his emphasis on semantic aspects 
of entailment and organization, but he does not provide 
a basis for the relational aspects of organization and 
complexity.28 
Leydesdorff and Dubois have also looked at anticipation in 
social systems, but their analytical model is orthogonal to 
the contradictorial LIR view of individual-group interactions. 
This basically states that the individual and the group share 
some of each other’s properties. 
7. CONCLUSION 
I have proposed a logic of and in reality as a new 
perspective on the nature of consciousness. My arguments 
have covered issues in fundamental physics, mechanisms 
of perception, and the emergence of consciousness, and 
implications of this view of consciousness for man in 
society. I am aware that the “transport dialectique,” to use 
the term of Gilles Deleuze, may have been a difficult one. 
My vision of the world and theories of the world as related, 
consistent, and inconsistent conflicts with much received 
wisdom. I ask, to begin with, that the reader renounce, for 
the sake of a science of consciousness, some standard 
(and cherished) notions not only of logic, but also set 
theory, category theory, causality, and accept concepts 
from the latest quantum field views of the secondary 
ontological status of spacetime. The methodology of LIR 
means looking for structures in nature that are potential as 
well as actual, in a sense that is neither more nor less than 
that a certain sequence of amino acids in an enzyme has 
the potential for binding with specific substrates under the 
appropriate conditions in the appropriate medium. 
In the LIR epistemology, we as knowers are not totally 
external to what is known by us and not completely 
different from it. I must know, then, that if there are other 
knowers, as there are, they must be part of my known and 
vice versa. The source of human dignity is in ourselves as 
knowers, but if we avoid the error of solipsism, the origin 
of the sense of moral responsibility can only come from the 
relation to other knowers, in other words, all human beings, 
and by extension, other beings and perhaps even, as 
suggested by Lorenzo Magnani, certain non-living entities. 
A contrario, one cannot find responsibility in oneself as 
an isolated agent. Since we are both a “not-other” and
an “other” at the same time, a self-interest argument for 
morality holds. Two or more human individuals and their 
relations constitute interactive systems in the LIR categorial 
sense of non-separable subjects and objects, sharing in 
part one another’s characteristics. An individual is no more 
isolated logically, psychologically, or morally than he or 
she is economically. The fact that potential or potentialized 
states exist does not, in a deterministic universe, mean that 
we have the capacity to make a choice among them that is 
independent of our genetic and experiential background. 
Every individual is indeed unique, but this should not be 
taken to mean that his or her mind is independent, since 
each incorporates a portion of the subjective experience of 
other brains. As Bennett and Hacker point out, our ability 
to know the states of other persons’ minds is not folk 
psychology, but a natural consequence of the evolution of 
our species. LIR simply adds the logical consequence as an 
origin of individual moral responsibility. 
My claim is that the LIR contradictorial picture of 
consciousness is a form of identity theory of mind which 
avoids the difficulties of both standard identity and dualist 
theories by the introduction of the principle of dynamic 
opposition at all levels of perception, mental processing, 
and action. No new, independent entities of the kind 
postulated in the various forms of representationalism 
are required, due to the availability, in LIR, of a dynamic 
relation between internal and external, actual and potential, 
and identical and diverse aspects of phenomena. It is the 
alternating actualizations and potentializations derived 
from initial energetic inputs that are our ideas, images, 
beliefs, etc. Some further phenomenological classification 
of these process elements (such as that made by Husserl) 
is possible, but it does not change the overall structure of 
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my proposed picture. One of my objectives to further this 
work is to find mathematical formalizations of the systems 
aspects of LIR that would render them both more accessible 
and more rigorous. I would be grateful for suggestions 
along these lines. 
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A Counterexample to the Church-Turing 
Thesis as Standardly Interpreted 
(Theoretical outline and technical results)1 
Doukas Kapantaïs 
ACADEMY OF ATHENS, RESEARCH CENTRE FOR GREEK
PHILOSOPHY 
The standard (extensional) interpretation of the Church-
Turing thesis is that every mechanically calculable function 
is Turing Machine computable. A counterexample to this 
interpretation is that proof of the totality of a function K
(from Kapantaïs) constructed upon addition, iteration and 
a family of programs on programs can be performed by a 
human, but not a Turing Machine. The human computer, 
assisted by some instructor, can construct a hierarchy of 
functions with broad similarities to the finite part of existing 
fast growing function hierarchies on the sole basis that 
addition is a mechanical item, which can be mechanically 
operated on according to some mechanical programs on 
programs and iteration. She can then calculate the values 
for any assignments to functions of this hierarchy, and can 
also arrive at proving that function K (a function that lies 
outside of the same hierarchy) is total. No Turing Machine 
can do the same, since a Peano Arithmetic proof of the 
totality of function K would have required Induction up to 
ε0. 
BACKGROUND 
Kapantaïs 2016 criticized a strong (intensional) interpretation 
of the Church-Turing thesis, according to which what the 
Thesis says is that everything which can be effectively 
calculated can be computed by a Turing Machine equivalent, 
with all maximal models of computation being equivalent 
to Turing Machines up to isomorphism.2 This interpretation 
has been criticized on the grounds that a human computer 
(computor, henceforth)3 can compute the values of the 
Ackermann function in a mechanical way, which cannot 
be translated into a Turing Machine computation in an 
isomorphism preserving manner.4 The proof that these 
specific calculations by the computor and the Turing Machine 
are not isomorphic rests on two particular assumptions. 
The first is the clearly true presumption that addition is a 
mechanical item, which can be mechanically operated 
on. The second is that a “for loop” mechanical operation 
that initially operates upon addition exists and iteration of 
it yields mechanical operations for all functions upon the 
Knuth up-arrow notation hierarchy. Such an operation can 
clearly be specified and justification given for why it should 
be regarded as mechanical. On these assumptions, it can 
be proved both that (i) a computor can employ a program 
made out of “for loops” uniquely for effectively calculating 
the values of the Ackermann function and (ii) that no Turing 
Machine can employ a program made out of “for loops” 
uniquely for the same task. Since there is a way a calculator 
can compute the values of the Ackermann function, which 
has no isomorphic counterpart in Turing Machines, there 
are models of computation, which are not Turing Machine 
equivalent up to isomorphism. 
The present proof builds on a counterexample to the 
standard (extensional) interpretation of the Church-Turing 
thesis. The standard interpretation does not contain 
the claim that all maximal models of computation are 
isomorphic. Its sole claim is that Turing Machines is one 
of them. That is to say that what matters concerning the 
extensional interpretation is the output(s) of the effective 
calculation(s), not how one arrives at this (these) output(s). 
The counterexample in the present proof rests upon a 
generalization of the algorithm in Kapantaïs 2016. It is a 
counterexample to the Thesis in its standard interpretation 
insofar as it shows that a proof of the totality of a function 
K can be performed by a computor but not by a Turing 
Machine. 
STIPULATIONS ABOUT THE CONCEPT OF A
MECHANICAL PROCESS 
Following Turing, Post, Kleene, and others, the terms 
“mechanical” and/or “effective” remain formally undefined 
in our proof.5 “Mechanical/effective” is taken to be the 
intuitive pre-formal notion all putative (maximal) models 
of computation aim at capturing. The test of whether 
they capture it or not must always be decided according 
to actual evidence. That is to say that in case one has no 
empirical evidence of a mechanical process that outbids 
Turing Machines one is compelled to abide with the Thesis, 
but, once such a model is put forward, one has to abandon 
it. This also means that the Thesis can only be refuted and 
never be proved, which, in turn, implies by no means that 
the Thesis might not be true. If it is true, no such model will 
ever be found and we will always be compelled to abide 
with the Thesis. However, we will never be in position to 
ascertain this fact from within our historical perspective. 
Pre-theoretical concepts are not formally defied, and yet 
pre-theoretical concepts are systematically discussed, 
which means that the absence of a formal definition over 
a concept does not condemn one to say nothing about 
the concept. As far as “mechanical” is concerned one is 
far from being at a loss on what to say. Direct evidence for 
the above is that there are lots of processes, about which 
one can be certain that they are mechanical, and lots of 
processes, of which one can be certain that they are not. 
Hence, even if the concept is formally undefined, we take 
it for granted that there is (ought to be) some general 
consensus on what is definitely mechanical and what is 
definitely nonmechanical. 
Stipulations 1 and 2 below aim at reflecting part of this 
general consensus on what is definitely mechanical and 
what is definitely nonmechanical. Keep in mind, however, 
that we do not suggest that each one of these or their 
conjunction is a definition of “mechanical”—even more so, 
since the term “mechanical” appears both in subject and 
predicate position in some of these Stipulations. 
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We distinguish between “mechanical” as an object 
predicate (“mechanical item”) and “mechanical” as a 
process predicate (“mechanical operation”). 
Stipulation1: All mechanical items are such that they can be 
manipulated by purely mechanical means. 
Examples of mechanical items according to Stipulation1: 
(a) Natural numbers in the form of finite sequences of 
strokes are mechanical items. Apprehending such a 
sequence and mechanically operating upon it does not 
require any interpretation of what the sequence stands for. 
(b) Computer programs are mechanical items. They signify 
nothing (at least for the machine) and yet the machine 
can, by purely mechanical means, “understand” what they 
expect it to do and do it. 
Stipulation2: All mechanical operations are such that (i) 
they engage purely mechanical means, e.g., no appeal 
to intuition, only finitary methods etc., (ii) the items they 
operate upon are mechanical, and (iii) the items they 
transform the items they operate upon are mechanical. 
Examples of mechanical operations according to 
Stipulation2: 
(a) Turing Machine numerical operations. 
(b) Mechanical operations on programs. 
Examples of nonmechanical items and operations according 
to Stipulations1-2: 
(a) Transfinite ordinals. They cannot be apprehended as 
finite sequences of strokes or by other mechanical/finitary 
means. 
(b) Implicit representations of transfinite ordinals within 
Peano Arithmetic by functions. The “representation” 
is a trick, requiring interpretation, i.e., these functions 
correspond to transfinite ordinals only for the proof theorist, 
who knows the trick/interpretation. 
(c) Transfinite arithmetical operations. 
So, some items/operations are definitely mechanical and 
some are definitely nonmechanical. Operations/items 
which are neither clearly mechanical nor nonmechanical 
must be classified on an individual basis. This applies also 
to all methods/operations within our proof. To begin with, 
they certainly do not betray any of the above criteria. Our 
claim is that they do not betray any other sensible criterion 
for “mechanical” either.6 
*** 
Our proof is performed within the following general 
setting. An instructor provides mechanical guidance to a 
computor, in order to enable her to construct a hierarchy 
of programs and to prove that a program lying outside of 
this hierarchy returns an output for every input to its input 
placeholders. This program is shown to calculate the values 
of a function, which, in order to be proved total by standard 
formal Arithmetic, requires Induction up to ε0. 
STRUCTURE OF THE PROOF 
STAGE 1 
Initially, a hierarchy H of infinite hierarchies of programs 
is generated. All programs in H are generated upon (i) a 
preexisting mechanical program for addition, (ii) iteration, 
and (iii) a family of programs on programs. All programs 
in H are named after a recursively trackable system of 
coordinates of the n<ω dimensional space. All programs 
in H correspond to recursive functions (i.e., they calculate 
values of specific recursive functions).7 While constructing 
H, the computor mimics ad indefinitum the way that the 
Ackermann function governs the Knuth up-arrow notation 
hierarchy, and it does so by systematically constructing 
new hierarchies upon functions that govern previous 
hierarchies. 
A function H’ governing H itself is proved total, relative 
to all assignments to its variables. H’ takes as arguments 
functions in H together with assignments to their variables 
and returns as values the values that these functions yield 
for the latter assignments. The clause “total, relative to all 
assignments to its variables” is key with respect to this and 
all our subsequent results.8 This is why: Most programs 
in H are noneffective, since most of them are either non 
effective pointers or “for loop” programs depending 
on noneffective pointers. The pointers in question are 
noneffective because they have infinite pointing scopes. 
The way that our calculator proves that functions calculated 
by these pointers are total is by mechanically showing that 
for any assignment to the variables of the same functions 
there is a mechanical method to construct an appropriate
for this assignment finite initial segment of the infinite 
pointing scope of the pointer in question, such that the 
pointer becomes effective relative to this assignment to 
the variables. So this is the core of our proof in Stage 1: It 
shows that there is a mechanical operation such that, on 
input a function in H and an assignment to its variables, 
makes the computor able to mechanically construct the 
programs needed for the calculation of the value of the 
same function for the same assignment. 
NB. H’ can be proved total by other means too. The most 
standard one employs Mathematical Induction up to ωω. 
This proof, instead of turning the noneffective pointers into 
effective relative to specific assignments to the variables, 
substitutes the pointers for other programs that calculate 
extensionally equivalent functions, and continues by 
μ-minimization in order to show these latter total. This is, 
in a sense, the “canonical” way to prove H’ total. Now, the 
height of the Induction employed in this, i.e., ωω, suggests 
that H’ as well as all functions governed by it can be 
proved total by Turing Machines too. So, thus far, this is 
not a refutation of the Church-Turing thesis, as standardly 
interpreted. 
STAGE 2 
We proceed by repeating the same general mechanical 
routine for the generation of infinite hierarchies of functions, 
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until we reach function K, which, in order to be proved 
total by Peano Arithmetic, would have required Induction 
up to ε0. We prove K total by Induction <ε0. We claim that 
this proof does not betray any among the intuitive criteria 
for “mechanical”, as stated in the first part, and we also 
claim that it does not betray any other expressly stated and 
sensible criterion for “mechanical” either. 
The proof in Stage 2 proceeds as follows. 
Following Stage 1, which ends by the program for 
function H’, the computor repeats ad indefinitum the 
same procedure. That is to say that, just like in Stage 1 
the computor constructs all programs by employing (i) a 
program for addition, (ii) a family of programs on programs, 
and (iii) iteration, she now constructs similar programs by 
employing the same (ii) and (iii), but, this time, she does so 
upon the program for H’, not addition; she also proves that 
a function H’’ governing these latter programs is total. This 
is straightforward because our proof in Stage 1 was relying 
solely on the fact that the program for addition is effective. 
Now, since the program for H’ is proved effective, the 
same procedure can be repeated on the basis of H’ being 
effective, and end with the proof of H’’ being effective. This 
whole process/algorithm can be repeated at will, so as to 
produce the sequence of programs: H’, H’’,…, that governs 
the sequence of hierarchies: H, H’,… 
Following this sub-stage, another program is constructed, 
which is a pointer to the entire sequence of the H, H’,… 
hierarchies. This program suggests another general 
process/algorithm for the generation of yet some other 
hierarchies of programs. 
In general, each new and more complex general algorithm 
for generating hierarchies of programs produces 
hierarchies that are more complex than the previous ones, 
and which are governed by more complex programs, and 
so on ad indefinitum. For example, just like the sequence of 
hierarchies H, H’,… is governed by a program that is more 
complex than any of the programs of the same hierarchy, 
this program suggests a general algorithm that produces 
a sequence of hierarchies of such hierarchies. These latter 
are governed by yet another more complex program, which 
suggests an even more complex general algorithm, and so 
on. 
Each such general algorithm is made to correspond to a 
distinct general iterative circle along our way to function K. 
We distinguish between “inner” and “outer” iterative such 
circles, but in order to see what these circles are, and how 
they matter in our proof, a digression is needed. 
All functions from within hierarchy H can be mechanically 
named by the computor, since their names come from the 
previously mentioned mechanical method of attributing 
coordinates of the n-dimensional space. For the rest of 
programs, i.e., the ones beyond H’, the same method won’t 
do, since the computor has no means to mechanically 
represent coordinates of the >ω dimensional space. For 
naming these programs, we employ a hybrid notational 
method, which uses the coordinates of the n-dimensional 
space still, albeit together with the entire ω vocabulary. The 
method resembles, in several respects, the Archimedean 
technique of enriching the depository of available numerals 
beyond an initial cluster. Moreover, the method is such that 
the name assigned to the program suggests (or at times 
is) the ordinal that is needed for the Peano Arithmetic 
proof of the totalness of the function corresponding to the 
program.9 E.g., the Peano Arithmetic proof for the totalness 
of H’ requires Induction up to ωω. The method used by 
the computor is such that the name of the program for 
H’ happens to be “ωω”. Notice here that the use of the ω
vocabulary is entirely for the needs of our proof and does 
not suggest any use of transfinite arithmetic tools on 
the part of the computor. Only the instructor knows the 
correspondence between names and ordinals. For the 
computor, all ω expressions are senseless names that 
have been given to the programs by a purely mechanical 
technique and upon a recursively definable vocabulary. 
Now, an “inner circle” in our way towards K is defined by the 
distance separating the pair of programs that govern two 
consecutive general iterative circles, as described above. 
In other words, to each distinct general iterative algorithm, 
there corresponds an inner circle. As for the specific names 
of programs located at the boundaries of the inner circles, 
they are such that they notationally represent the distance 
between two limit ordinals. For example, the distance 
between programs ωω and ωω+ω constitutes an inner circle, 
and program ωω+ω is meant to be a pointer to all programs 
of the hierarchy ωω, ωω+1, ωω+2,… 
An “outer circle,” on the other hand, is represented by
the distance separating a program ω(ω^…^ω)n and a program
ω(ω^…^ω)n+1, where the ω tower of the latter exceeds the ω
tower of former by one ω. (Obviously, each outer circle is
also an inner circle.) 
Finally, program K is a pointer to all programs of the 
sequence of ω towers, ωω , ωω^ω , ωω^ω^ω,… Exactly because K 
is this pointer, and also because of the specific program-
naming technique we have employed, it is obvious that 
the Peano Arithmetic proof for K’s totalness would have 
required Induction up to ε0. For notice that the Peano 
Arithmetic proof of the totalness of the function calculated 
by program ωω^ω is ωω^ω, the Peano Arithmetic proof of the 
totalness of the function calculated by program ωω^ω^ω is 
ωω^ω^ω, and, so, the Peano Arithmetic proof of the totalness 
of the function calculated by K, which is a pointer to all 
programs within the above sequence, must be ε0. 
Our main proof consists in showing by Induction <ε0 that
K is total. 
The Induction for our main result is on the length of ω-s
in the above towers. It proceeds as follows. First, we use 
the result of Stage 1 and take for granted that the program 
ωω (i.e., the program for H’) returns an output for every 
input. Then, we prove that all programs from ωω to ωω^ω, 
this one included, return an output for every input. Finally, 
we assume that some program ω(ω^…^ω)n with arbitrary n 
returns an output for every input, and show that, on this 
assumption, ω(ω^…^ω)n+1 returns an output for every input. 
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This essentially completes the proof, because program K is 
a pointer to all programs of the sequence of ω towers. So, 
since K is a pointer to all such programs, the claim that it 
returns an output for all inputs is equivalent with the claim 
that (i) all programs at the boundaries of the outer circles 
return an output for all inputs and (ii) K has effective means 
to reduce any assignment to its input placeholders to an 
assignment to the input placeholders of (i). We show (ii) in 
a separate proof. 
In some more detail, the core of the main proof consists in 
showing that there is a construction chain of programs that 
leads from ω(ω^…^ω)n to ω(ω^…^ω)n+1, such that “effectiveness” 
is hereditary upon it. We show this by some subsidiary 
Induction that takes place within our main Inductive step, 
i.e., within the circle that begins by ω(ω^…^ω)n and ends 
with ω(ω^…^ω)n+1. This subsidiary Induction is on the inner 
circles in between ω(ω^…^ω)n and ω(ω^…^ω)n+1. Hereditariness 
of “effectiveness” concerns programs within these inner 
circles. For example, as said previously, the distance 
between programs ωω and ωω+ω constitutes an inner circle. 
Now, this inner circle happens to be within the outer circle 
ωω to ωω^ω. In order to prove that effectiveness is hereditary
in between ωω and ωω+ω, we first assume that program ωω is
effective and then show that the pointer ωω+ω, which has the
sequence ωω, ωω+1, ωω+2,…, as its pointing scope is effective
too. Here again, the clause “relative to all assignments” is
key to our proof. For the pointer ωω+ω is not effective in
the standard use of the term, since it has an infinite scope.
The pointer becomes effective relative to all assignment to
its input placeholders, because the computor can acquire
a mechanical method, which reduces any assignment to
the input placeholders of ωω+ω to an assignment to the
input placeholders of a program from within the sequence
ωω , ωω+1, ωω+2,…, and can also learn how to mechanically
construct this program. Again, this because the computor
learns from the instructor how to mechanically construct
any initial segment of the sequence of programs ωω, ωω+1,
ωω+2,… By similar sub-proofs, the entire distance between
ωω and ωω^ω is traversed. Mutatis mutandis, so can be
traversed the distance between ω(ω^…^ω)n and ω(ω^…^ω)n+1 of our
main Inductive step. 
*** 
If our general claim is correct, and nothing but mechanical 
means are employed in our proof, this proof consists in 
a refutation of the Church-Turing thesis, as standardly 
interpreted. This is because in standard formal arithmetic 
the proof of function K’s totalness requires Induction up 
ε0. So, our proof is a refutation of the Church-Turing thesis, 
because a consequence of the Church-Turing thesis is 
that Turing Machines and equivalent formalisms exhaust 
the limits of “mechanically computable.” Therefore, since 
Peano Arithmetic is such a formalism and Peano Arithmetic 
(if consistent) cannot prove K total, there is a mechanical 
operation that cannot be performed by Turing Machines: 
the mechanical proof of the totalness of function K. 
NOTES 
1.	 This is a summary of both our general philosophical argument 
and of the specific technical results. 
2.	 Dershowitz and Gurevich, “A Natural Axiomatization of 
Computability and Proof of Church’s Thesis”; Boker and 
Dershowitz, “The Church-Turing Thesis Over Arbitrary Domains”; 
Gurevich, “Sequential Abstract State Machines Capture Sequential 
Algorithms”; heavily relying on Gandy, “The Confluence of Ideas 
in 1936”; and Sieg, “Step By Recursive Step: Church’s Analysis of 
Effective Calculability” and “Calculations by Man and Machine: 
Conceptual Analysis”; see also Sieg, “Church without a Dogma: 
Axioms for Computability.” 
3.	 Following Gandy, “The Confluence of Ideas in 1936”, we call 
“computor” a human that computes, i.e., she is not allowed to 
employ nonmechanical means during her calculations. 
4.	 Kapantaïs, “A Refutation of the Church-Turing Thesis According to 
Some Interpretation of What the Thesis Says.” 
5.	 Turing, “On Computable Numbers, with an Application to 
the Entscheidungsproblem,” ch. 9; Post, “Finite Combinatory 
Processes – Formulation” Kleene, Introduction to 
Metamathematics. 
6.	 For an indicative picture with respect to these, see Piccinini, “The 
Physical Church-Turing Thesis: Modest or Bold?” 
7.	 In this proof-sketch, we will suppress the difference between 
functions and programs constructed by the computor for 
calculating the values of the same functions. We hope that which 
is which is always clear from the context. 
8.	 See also Stage 2: main inductive step. 
9.	 In this summary, we will encounter no hybrid names, though 
there are plenty of such in the hierarchies beyond H. 
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RAPAPORT Q&A 
Logicist Remarks on Rapaport on 
Philosophy of Computer Science+ 
(in the context of his Barwise Prize) 
Selmer Bringsjord 
RENSSELAER POLYTECHNIC INSTITUTE 
INTRODUCTORY REMARKS 
I shall restrict my brief remarks herein to William “Bill” 
Rapaport on philosophy of computer science (PCS) and 
some intimately related topics (which are gestured at 
by the superscripted + in my title), guided by his ever-
expanding, online Philosophy of Computer Science (PCS); 
and I’ll begin (in the next section) with some comments 
on this restriction itself. The present commentary is 
informed by a recent, sustained dialogue with Rapaport, 
one undertaken to inform my remarks (and, I confess, to 
allow me to somewhat selfishly enjoy some philosophical 
debate).1 Unfortunately, and I wrap up the present essay by 
returning to this issue, our dialogue, at least by my lights, 
needs to continue, because important societal issues in the 
context of the philosophico-history of computer science 
and AI have been left unanalyzed, and more importantly (at 
least as I see things), because Rapaport (and his readers) 
would be well-served by having some errors that infect 
his PCS, beyond those touched upon herein, remedied. In 
particular, since—for reasons to be shortly seen—he views 
CS through the obfuscating lens of algorithms (first do A; 
now do B; if condition C holds, do A again; and so on), rather 
than as a part of reasoning in a well-defined logical system, 
it’s especially important that Rapaport’s account of PCS, 
which seems destined to be highly influential, be modified. 
I suppose it’s possible that despite sustained discussion 
with him subsequent to what informs the present essay, he 
may resist such modification; but I hold out hope that he 
will engage in the discussion and see the light. 
THE VASTNESS OF RAPAPORT’S REACH VS.
WHAT I TREAT 
As the reader will well know, much if not all of the field 
of philosophy is composed of sub-parts long traditionally 
designated by the phrase “philosophy of X,” where 
instantiations of X include, for instance, “mind,” “art,” 
“economics,” “religion,” and “language.”2 In cases where 
a sub-part of philosophy is designated without this syntax, 
as, for example, “epistemology” or “metaphysics,” there 
can be little doubt that no accuracy is sacrificed if the PoX
template is employed (though elegance, I concede, is 
threatened). Rapaport has made contributions in many a 
philosophy of X ≠ ‘computer science’ area, but my interest, 
in keeping with his recent Barwise Prize, and with the 
venue that the present discussion is bound for, is PCS, to 
which, arguably, Rapaport is the greatest contributor—and 
at any rate he certainly stands minimally as one of the five 
or so greatest authorities on PCS today, when the whole 
of CS, from theory to concrete practice, is considered. The 
restriction to PCS means, in particular, that very little will be 
said herein about philosophy of artificial intelligence (PAI),3 
another PoX subject on which Rapaport is a world-class 
authority, in no small part because of his being a longtime 
leader in a seminal team at the University at Buffalo devoted 
to AI and computational cognitive science. Multiple essays 
of the present sort could be written on the work of this 
group in connection with PCS and PAI, a group long led as 
well by AI pillar Stuart “Stu” Shapiro. Shapiro and Rapaport 
have long labored to advance the SNePS system, which 
can be used to build artificial agents that know, reason, 
plan, and act. Obviously, upon hearing my implicit claim 
(expressed by the previous sentence) that such artificial 
agents are on a planet that’s lucky, AI-wise, to build self-
driving cars that only occasionally kill people, readers who 
are philosophers will pay attention. Are such agents in fact 
with us already? it will be asked by such readers. I think an 
affirmative reply would come from Rapaport and Shapiro, 
and I suggest that philosophers of CS, AI, mind, and logic 
study the work in question, deeply. 
So the target is Rapaport on PCS. In our context, this target 
should strike the alert reader as pregnant. I’m writing for the 
Philosophy and Computers Committee (P&CC) of the APA; 
note my emphasis. It follows that I’m writing for a committee 
whose mission centers on the relationship between 
philosophy on the one hand, and “computers” on the other. 
But what is the meaning of “computers” in this mission? 
This is very much like the question with which Rapaport 
has wrestled, when, for instance, he deliberated about 
what title to use for his PCS book. It turns out that he isn’t 
particularly happy with the phrase “philosophy of computer 
science.” He finds the continuous string “computerscience” 
to be helpful, because (to brutally simplify the issue and his 
thinking) this neologism is easier to view as something that 
picks out a domain over which to philosophize that isn’t in 
any way narrowly restricted to computers, or to what must 
be a science, and so on. One would think that a similar 
attitude is wise to adopt regarding the title and nature of 
the P&CC: Surely this committee’s mission isn’t any such 
narrow thing as exploring, sorting out, and charting for 
the APA the relationship between philosophy and, literally, 
computers, as in laptops and desktops. Surely “computers” 
here is to mean that vast space of all philosophical things 
computational and computation-based, from all that 
Rapaport deals with in the bordering-on-1,000-page PCS
volume, to rigorously characterizing what privacy is by the 
standards of philosophy (which includes characterizations 
in its analytic side that at least aspire to jointly necessary 
and sufficient conditions) in an age of social media, where 
interaction on the shoulders of computation has led to 
philosophical problems as thorny as most longstanding 
ones, an issue to which I return when wrapping up. 
Please note that in confining attention to Rapaport on 
PCS, the target remains enormous. This is true for the 
simple reason that PCS itself is gigantic. It’s perhaps not 
uninteresting that in philosophy today, still, PCS is often 
thought of as some kind of Lilliputian curiosity off to the 
side, with the center proudly occupied by the venerable 
giants (ethics, epistemology, metaphysics, etc.) continuing 
to go merrily along as they have since Socrates. Those with 
this attitude should read PCS, and then think objectively 
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about whether this traditional center-side conceptualization 
is accurate and/or sensible today. We have reached a time, 
now, when the prospect of artificial agents (which after all 
consist in things whose essence is computing over input to 
produce output) that are ethical agents unto themselves, 
with radical forms of autonomy (e.g., the ability to write the 
very programs that power them), seem to many imminent. 
Understanding these creatures, and what they mean for 
us and the cosmos, will be impossible without a prior 
understanding of PCS. 
ACTUALLY, COMPUER SCIENCE IS A (SMALL)
PROPER PART OF LOGIC 
In PCS Rapaport bravely gives a distilled answer to “What is 
computer science?” The answer is given at the very end of 
the chapter whose title is the very question, and, verbatim, 
Rapaport’s summative reply is this: 
Computer science is the scientific (or STEM) study of: 
what problems can be solved, 
what tasks can be accomplished, 
and what features of the world can be understood . . . 
. . . computationally, that is, using a language with only: 
2 nouns (‘0’, ‘1’), 
3 verbs (‘move’, ‘print’, ‘halt’), 
3 grammar rules (sequence, selection, repetition), and 
nothing else, 
and then to provide algorithms to show how this can 
be done: 
efficiently, practically, physically, and ethically. 
This answer has a certain flair, I think. After all, by it, a great, 
big, daunting philosophical question is answered crisply 
and confidently in nothing more than a flash. Unfortunately, 
this is an account of computer science ferociously biased 
in the procedural direction. (The account is very nicely 
elaborated in PCS, and is explicitly aligned with (similarly 
biased) accounts of so-called “computational thinking,” 
the cultivation of which, at least in the US, is sought by its 
federal government, by many states as well, and by funders 
like the Gates Foundation.) Yet this is not my answer to the 
question, nor is it even approximately in line with my answer; 
and I doubt whether it’s the answer that would be given 
by anyone who thinks of computation as a proper part of 
reasoning and nothing more, not as a do-this-step-do that-
step-do-this-step (DTS) process. Moreover, for philosophy 
and philosophers, I think a DTS account of CS is particularly 
unwise. The reason is simply that philosophers, if they do 
nothing else, reason; and to teach philosophy is therefore 
naturally to in no small part teach how to reason. (Such 
pedagogy is of course self-evidently in operation in the case 
of logic as taught and pursued under philosophy.) In my 
experience, sometimes philosophers with little exposure to 
CS are surprised to learn that computation can be studied 
and mastered, without loss of formal generality or of 
practical functioning, as reasoning, but some illumination 
can be provided quickly by presenting the rudiments of 
standard logic programming. I personally have found that 
the instant a rigorously trained philosopher without any 
prior exposure to computer science/computation is shown 
the underlying theory of logic programming for Prolog (a 
programming language in the logic-programming fold), a 
light snaps on.4 In fact, sometimes the coming on of that 
mental light is more akin to a sort of explosive eureka 
moment. “Wait, you mean a valid deduction by the machine 
from this set A of formulae expressed in something that 
looks quite like first-order logic, to that particular formula 
p, is what execution of my ‘program’ consists in?!?” That is 
correct. No need to write any DTS thingie here, at all. The 
traditional coverage of logic programming in mathematical 
logic isn’t based on inference schemata that philosophers 
learn (e.g., modus tollens, universal elimination, etc.), but 
rather on inference schemata in the proof theories based 
on schemata conforming to resolution, but regardless, 
this is a far superior way to understand what computation 
is, in my opinion—yet this way is utterly alien in the DTS 
landscape of PCS.5 
SEMANTICS AS SEMANTICS, AND SEARLE 
I have been intrigued for years by Rapaport’s longstanding 
desire to portray semantics as syntax, and accordingly 
took up for the present project his 2016 “Semantics as 
Syntax” (which was wisely solicited by editor Boltuc) to 
study. Rapaport, as far as it goes, is entirely correct, at 
least spiritually speaking. (I’m limited to saying only that 
Rapaport is in spirit right, because were details discussed 
here, too much space would be consumed.) For my 
money, one major reason he’s right is that the fundamental 
observations upon which proof-theoretic semantics (in 
any form thereof) is motivated by, and possibly even 
rests upon directly, can’t be denied.6 A simple example 
comes by way of considering the standard extensional 
semantics of a conditional with p as antecedent and q as 
consequent. We are standardly told in this case that the 
semantics for a material conditional p => q consists in that 
such a conditional holds if and only if (iff), if p, then q. That 
is, expressed a bit more succinctly, p => q iff if p then q. 
When you think about it, this is quite extraordinarily one-
dimensional. Does it not directly give semantics via syntax? 
Consider the conditional (p & q) => q. Does this conditional 
have the semantic value TRUE? Certainly. Why? Because it’s 
TRUE iff if p and q, then q. Well, is it in turn TRUE that if p
and q, then q? Absolutely: 
Proof: Suppose that p holds, along with q. We can deduce 
q directly. Hence our supposition implies q. QED
We are here using the standard textbook semantics 
for elementary extensional deductive logic, in use in 
classrooms across the globe, and what just happened? 
What happened is that we pinned down the meaning of the 
syntactic formula via a perfectly, indeed purely, syntactic 
process.7 I view Rapaport as having found this phenomenon 
at work in a deep and intricate way, far and wide. 
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Yet why do I say that Rapaport’s “sem-by-syn” view is correct 
only as far as it goes? The reason is that Rapaport is spot on 
with respect to one sense of “semantics,” and dead wrong 
with regard to another sense of the term. The first sense 
aligns with proof-theoretic semantics, in general; we have 
just seen this sense in operation on a simple specimen; 
and it aligns with any formal dyad covering syntax on the 
one hand and semantics on the other. Unfortunately, the 
second sense can’t be separated from understanding on 
the part of a mind; this is the Searlean sense of semantics, 
and is what stands at the heart of Searle’s justly famous 
Chinese Room Argument (CRA), whose kernel, as a slogan, 
is that syntax doesn’t produce semantics. Rapaport 
believes that the sem-by-syn view can be extended in 
order to allow syntactic expressions (e.g., “hamburger”) to 
be “internalized,” and hence CRA to be dodged. He writes: 
In the case of a real human being, [a] representative
is the end result of, say, the visual process of seeing 
a hamburger . . . resulting in a “mental image” of 
a hamburger. . . . More precisely, the biological 
neural network in the human’s brain has neurons 
whose firing represent the word ‘hamburger’, and 
it has neurons whose firings represent the actual 
hamburger. Both of these sets of neuron firings 
are in the same “language”—the same syntactic 
system.8 
This quote does nothing beyond communicating the faith 
of computationalist materialists, and/or (with the “neuron” 
here, e.g., mapped to artificial neurons in artificial neural 
networks so in vogue again these days) Strong AIniks. Can’t 
we imagine this more elaborate syntactic dance happening 
in the complete and utter absence of our understanding, 
bound up with subjective awareness as it is, of the shout 
by a grillmaster that our redolent burger is done? Of course 
we can. What Rapaport is in the end doing is ingeniously 
(but to a degree unwittingly) working out the sem-by-syn 
paradigm in and for AI—but not for us. 
HYPERCOMPUTATION 
Rapaport’s PCS includes a chapter on hypercomputation 
(which is, harshly encapsulated, forms of information-
processing more powerful than the operation of standard 
Turing machines); coverage of the topic therein is what 
most would no doubt classify as “steadfastly balanced.” 
I somewhat less charitably classify this chapter as 
noncommittal, and in being so, well, irrational. However, 
the chapter is also, even in its present, not-fully-polished 
form, the absolute best overview of the topic available in 
one place, over one digestible-in-one-sitting stretch of 
content. Indeed, I suspect that even most aggressive fans 
of hypercomputation will regard the chapter’s wishy-washy 
maybe-maybe-not position on hypercomputation to be 
fully redeemed by its laconic erudition, right down to the 
lucid presentation of some key theorems. After all, PCS is 
intended to be a broad-coverage textbook, not a polemical 
position statement. 
Nonetheless, I’ve declared the chapter to be irrational. 
Why? In short, because there can be no denying, in light 
of the relevant logico-mathematics, that hypercomputation 
is as real and robust as can be, in the context of the fact 
that even if (like me) we count Leibniz as having discovered 
general-purpose computation in the seventeenth 
century, the human race has really only been at this 
modern computation thing for about three centuries. The 
late twentieth century, and the beginning of the third 
millennium, have revealed that computation absolutely, 
positively cannot be rationally restricted to what standard 
Turing machines and their equivalents (which Rapaport 
lists and often discusses in PCS) can compute. I can’t here 
review in any detail my own writings on this subject, and 
will rest content to mention but two things. To wit: 
One: Rapaport respectfully cites and discusses Martin 
Davis’s “The Myth of Computation.” While there can be 
no denying that Davis is the author of much brilliant work, 
this paper is far from his finest hour; it may, in fact, be 
his worst. Calling a spade a spade (and I did have the 
opportunity to do so orally, in debating the issue with Davis 
in person), joined by my colleague N. S. Govindarajulu, we 
wrote something I recommend to Rapaport, his readers, 
and readers of the present essay: “The Myth of ‘The Myth 
of Hypercomputation’,”9 in which is shown that Davis’s 
arguments are anemic at best and stunningly fallacious at 
worst. I confess to being deeply surprised that Rapaport is 
content, at least at present, to leave the impression that Davis 
may have succeeded in revealing that hypercomputation is 
to be placed alongside, say, Hercules and Odin. 
Two: It’s a logico-mathematical fact that hypercomputation 
is as real as can be. In the logicist interpretation of computer 
science adumbrated above, we have only to consider, for 
a few minutes, any number of computing machines vastly 
more powerful than standard Turing machines and their 
equivalents, specified via the use of formal logic. Not 
wanting (again) to cite my own work in this connection, I can 
simply rely on infinite-time Turing machines;10 they provably 
exceed standard Turing machines, and yet are Turing 
machines; end of story. An even-more-direct route is simply 
to take note of the fact that formal logic includes infinitary 
logics, and some reasoning (e.g., proof discovery) in even 
the smallest of these (which allow infinitely long formulae 
and infinitely long proofs) is logic-style hypercomputation. 
Of course, some myopic empiricists may deny the reality 
of hypercomputation because they affirm the dogma 
that what is real is only what is physical. But this position 
is not only at odds with such mathematical facts as that 
there is a natural number N too large to correspond to any 
physical entity whose components sum to N; it’s also at 
odds with something that Rapaport leaves aside: Since we 
are coming to see that physics can be axiomatized (by, say, 
the axiom system P), absent a disproof of the proposition 
that P and a formal assertion of the physical existence of 
hypercomptuational machine is consistent, it’s irrational 
to advance the claim that hypercomputation is only 
mathematically possible.11 
FINAL REMARKS 
Any serious dialogue with Rapaport, and engagement 
with his writings, could clearly continue, profitably and 
enjoyably, for a very long time. Yet, as is always the case, in 
order for a piece to be delivered and published, we must 
end—with, if you’ll allow, a final thought: viz., that we need 
to hear at some point soon from Rapaport-qua-philosopher 
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on the history of computation, of the fields which centrally 
partake of it (e.g AI, logic, mathematics, linguistics, and 
nowadays computing machines as ethical agents), and 
on the complex and philosophically charged turbulence 
that has now been catalyzed by so-called “social media.” 
Rapaport’s professional life shows no signs of slowing 
down (witness the ever-growing PCS book itself), which 
means his contributions will continue, but his professional 
life to this point has passed through the evolution of the 
computational sciences over a period of decades, during 
which time a lot has happened. Rapaport is one of only 
a handful of computationally informed philosophers who 
have seen firsthand the evolution (with an occasional spate 
of rapid change) of the many parts of philosophy intimately 
connected to computation (philosophy of mind, of 
language, etc.). Did he ever think for a moment, yesterday, 
that today’s advocacy of the end of programming (in 
light of such phenomena as “Deep Learning”) would ever 
arrive? That the concept of a machine which self-learns 
and thereby beats humans at their own games would 
become reality, as happened in the case of AlphaGo? Did 
he think, yesterday, that computation, first isolated in the 
minds and soon thereafter the simple, disconnected “pet” 
machines of Turing and von Neurmann et al., would come 
to mediate arguably all that Earth’s technologized youth do, 
daily, via social-media technology? In all this, who are we? 
What is truth? What is fake? What is real? What control can 
computation be allowed to have over our interaction with 
each other, and over the analysis and presentation thereof? 
Philosophy, and anyone concerned with the intersection 
“philosophy and computers,” is going to need to come to 
grips with these computation-infused questions, the lack 
of answers to which has already started to plague us.12 
Actually, truth be told, I need to come grips in this regard. 
Time to talk again to Rapaport . . . 
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NOTES 
1.	 The current version of PCS, as this sentence is written, is May 
2018, and is available at https://cse.buffalo.edu/~rapaport/ 
Papers/phics.pdf. The reader should take account of the 
difference between PCS (the subject) and—note the italics—PCS, 
the Rapaportian book on that very subject. 
2.	 I don’t mean to imply that the sub-parts of philosophy to which I 
refer are self-contained. In point of fact, philosophy of language 
and philosophy of logic (in the Occidental case, anyway), are 
inseparably linked. Another inseparable link, one at the heart of 
any comprehensive analysis of Rapaport’s PCS and his body of 
work, is that between PCS and PAI. 
3.	 PAI, and for that matter AI itself from a philosophical point of 
view, is covered in the SEP entry Artificial Intelligence (https:// 
plato.stanford.edu/entries/artificial-intelligence). 
4.	 Wonderful introductory coverage of logic programming is 
provided in Ebbinghaus et al., Mathematical Logic. 
5.	 I would personally have preferred to use automated theorem 
proving rather than Prolog’s basis in what I just wrote, but the 
need for economy at the moment rules. This is as good a place as 
any to report that in my interview of Rapaport, he indicated that 
he opted for DTS, and the encapsulation of it that I’ve quoted, 
for pedagogical purposes. However, even taking his expression 
of this strategy at face value, as I’ve explained, even from the 
perspective of pedagogy, reasoning is by my lights something 
much more valuable to teach than DTS. And besides, even after 
DTS is used, we are still left with the challenge of showing that 
the procedural artifact we have produced is correct; and showing 
this can only be accomplished via reasoning. Why not simply 
start and end with reasoning? 
6.	 Readers unfamiliar with proof-theoretic semantics could start 
with Gentzen, “Investigations into Logical Deduction.” For 
what it’s worth, nearly all my own work in intensional logic and 
philosophy is proof-theoretic in nature. See, e.g., Bringsjord et al., 
“Introducing the Doxastically Centered Approach to Formalizing 
Relevance Bonds in Conditionals.” 
7.	 Die-hard Tarskians might accuse me of tendentiously and unfairly 
passing straightaway to a proof, rather than giving a truth-table 
or truth-tree (or in the first-order case a model/interpretation). 
Balderdash. We shall need for the skeptic a proof that the result 
of tabular or tree-based manipulation yields TRUE. 
8.	 Rapaport, “Semantics as Sytax,” 12. 
9.	 Govindarajulu and Bringsjord, “The Myth of ‘The Myth of 
Hypercomputation’.” 
10. Hamkins and Lewis, “Infinite Time Turing Machines,” 
11.	 Govindarajulu et al., “Proof Verification and Proof Discovery for 
Relativity,” isn’t a bad place to start reading about such matters. 
12. I recommend, as a quick, non-technical start to this side of PCS, 
Wiesberg, “The Digital Poorhouse.” 
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Comments on Bringsjord’s “Logicist 
Remarks” 
William J. Rapaport 
UNIVERSITY AT BUFFALO, THE STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK 
1. INTRODUCTION 
I am grateful to my long-time friend and debating partner
Selmer Bringsjord for the email interview that was the source
of his “Logicist Remarks”1 and for his generous comments
on my research and my textbook-in-draft.2 In this brief
response, I simply wish to clarify three of my positions. 
2. A PROCEDURAL-LOGICAL CONTROVERSY 
Whereas I argue that computer science is fundamentally 
concerned with algorithms,3 Bringsjord argues that 
“computation . . . [is] a proper part of reasoning and nothing 
more.”4 It’s the “and nothing more” clause that I disagree 
with. 
I agree that computation as a subject of study can be 
viewed “as a proper part of reasoning” or logic. But it can 
just as well be viewed as the study of (what Bringsjord 
somewhat dismissively characterizes as “do-this-step-do­
that-step-do-this-step”) procedures (loc. cit.). These are 
equivalent viewpoints from different perspectives. But I 
find the procedural perspective more perspicuous.5 
This is exactly the same situation that we find in the theory 
of computation: Computation as a mathematical enterprise 
can be understood functionally, in terms of recursive 
functions or the lambda calculus (as well as in other ways, 
and by other formalisms), as well as procedurally, in 
terms of Turing machines or register machines (etc.). The 
multiple views (in both cases) are not rivals, but equivalent 
alternatives, each with its own advantages. Gödel found 
the Turing-machine analysis more convincing as a model 
of computability than even his own recursive functions.6 
Similarly, I would argue, the procedural view is more 
compelling (for me, as well as for my students) than the 
logical view with respect to what is unique and interesting 
about computer science and computation. 
3. SYNTACTIC SEMANTICS 
I have long advocated for the position that syntax 
suffices for semantics—that the semantic enterprise of 
understanding is fundamentally a syntactic one. Briefly, I 
take syntax as the study of the properties of, and relations 
among, the members of a set of objects, and I take 
semantics as the study of the relations between two sets of 
objects—one studied syntactically, and other providing its 
semantic interpretation. (The latter set can also be studies 
syntactically, and its syntax is its “ontology”.) But when you 
take the union of those two sets, the formerly semantic 
relations become syntactic ones of the union.7 A real-life, 
biological (and not merely “Strong AI”) example of such 
a union is the neuron firings in our brain, some of which 
represent the objects in the external world and some of 
which represent the concepts (and language) that we use 
to understand them. But they all form one neural network. 
Bringsjord says that “this . . . does nothing beyond 
communicating the faith of computationalist materialists, 
and/or . . . Strong AIniks.”8 But it does do more than that: 
It shows that our sub-jective sense of understanding—the 
kind involved in Bringsjord’s example of “the shout by a 
grillmaster that our redolent burger is done” (loc. cit.)— 
is accomplished by a single system (a single, unioned 
set) that is understood syntactically, not by two separate 
systems (a syntactically understood one and its semantic 
interpretation). 
4. HYPERCOMPUTATION 
Bringsjord’s discussion of my position on hypercomputation 
was based on an earlier version of Philosophy of Computer 
Science, Chapter 11, than the one currently available. That 
earler version was, indeed, somewhat “noncommittal.”9 
Rather than distinguishing between Turing-machine 
computation and hyper-computation, I prefer to think of 
there being three categories:10 
Sub-Turing Computation: 
Finite-state automata, pushdown automata, primitive 
recursive functions, etc. 
Turing-Machine Computation: 
Turing machines and their equivalents (partial recursive 
functions, lambda calculus, etc.) 
Super-Turing Computation: 
Oracle machines, Zeus machines, Malament-Hogarth 
machines, analog recurrent neural networks, interactive 
computing, trial-and-error machines, etc. 
To my mind, the only interesting kinds of super-Turing 
computation are not the “newer physics” kind (Zeus machines,
etc.),11 but the ones that can be modeled by Turing’s own 
theory of oracle machines. These include interactive and 
trial-and-error computing. But oracle computation, studied 
under the rubric ‘relative computability’, is well-understood 
and not something that computer scientists have ignored 
(as some hypercomputationalists have suggested). Nor is 
it typically un-derstood as a counterexample to the Church-
Turing Computability Thesis.12 
5. CONCLUSION 
Bringsjord raised a number of important questions in his 
“Final Remarks” (some of which I touch on in my book), 
observing that it was “time to talk again to Rapaport.” I look 
forward to continuing our conversation! 
NOTES 
1.	 Bringsjord, “Logicist Remarks on Rapaport on Philosophy of 
Computer Science.” 
2.	 Rapaport, “Philosophy of Computer Science.” 
3.	 Rapaport, “What Is Computer Science?” 13–16; Rapaport, 
“Philosophy of Computer Science,” §3.15 
4.	 Bringsjord, “Logicist Remarks on Rapaport on Philosophy of 
Computer Science,” §“Actually, Computer Science Is a (Small) 
Proper Part of Logic,” my italics. 
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5.	 As I note in Rapaport, “Philosophy of Computer Science,” §§2.3, 
2.7, on the question of what philosophy is, I take philosophy to 
be the personal search for truth, in any field, by rational means, 
following Hector-Neri Castañeda, who said that philosophy 
should be done “in the first person, for the first person” 
(Rapaport, “Castañeda, Hector-Neri”). 
6.	 Gödel, “Undecidable Diophantine Propositions,” 168; 
Shagrir, “Gödel on Turing on Computability”; Sieg, “Gödel 
on Computability”; Soare, “Turing Oracle Machines, Online 
Computing, and Three Displacements in Computability Theory,” 
§2; Copeland and Shagrir, “Turing versus Gödel on Computability 
and the Mind.” 
7.	 Rapaport, “Searle’s Experiments with Thought”; “Syntactic 
Semantics: Foundations of Computational Natural-Language 
Understanding”; “Understanding Understanding: Syntactic 
Semantics and Computational Cognition”; “How to Pass a Turing 
Test: Syntactic Semantics, Natural-Language Understanding, and 
First-Person Cognition”; “Holism, Conceptual-Role Semantics, 
and Syntactic Semantics”; “What Did You Mean By That? 
Misunderstanding, Negotiation, and Syntactic Semantics”; 
“How Helen Keller Used Syntactic Semantics to Escape from a 
Chinese Room”; “Yes, She Was! Reply to Ford’s ‘Helen Keller Was 
Never in a Chinese Room’”; “Semiotic Systems, Computers, and 
the Mind: How Cognition Could Be Computing”; “Semantics as 
Syntax”; and “Syntactic Semantics and the Proper Treatment of 
Computationalism.” 
8.	 Bringsjord, “Logicist Remarks on Rapaport on Philosophy of 
Computer Science,” §“Semantics as Semantics, and Searle.” I 
suspect that this section title is a typo for “Semantics as Syntax, 
and Searle.” 
9.	 Bringsjord, “Logicist Remarks on Rapaport on Philosophy of 
Computer Science,” §“Hypercomputation.” 
10. I am limiting myself here to digital computing, so analog 
computation is another story, told best, I think, in Piccinini, 
Physical Computation: A Mechanistic Account. 
11.	 The term “newer physics” is from Copeland and Sylvan, 
“Computability Is Logic-Relative,” 190. 
12. See Davis, Computability and Unsolvability, 20–24; Soare, “Turing 
Oracle Machines, Online Computing, and Three Displacements 
in Computability Theory”; Soare, “Formalism and Intuition in 
Computability”; and Fortnow, “What Is Computation?” for this 
point of view. 
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Exploring the Territory: The Logicist Way 
and Other Paths into the Philosophy of 
Computer Science 
Robin K. Hill 
UNIVERSITY OF WYOMING
Robin K. Hill is an adjunct professor in both the Wyoming Institute for 
Humanities Research and the Philosophy Department of the University of 
Wyoming, and a Lecturer there in Computer Science, and writes a blog 
on the philosophy of computer science for the online Communications 
of the ACM. 
William J. Rapaport holds the position of Associate Professor Emeritus of 
Computer Science, as wells as Affiliated Faculty Emeritus in Philosophy 
and Linguistics, Member Emeritus of the Center for Cognitive Science, 
and Associate Director of the SNePS Research Group, all at the University 
at Buffalo.
The scholarly work on the philosophy of computer science 
that most nearly achieves comprehensive coverage is the 
“Philosophy of Computer Science” textbook, manifest as 
an ever-growing resource online,1 by William J. Rapaport, 
winner of both the Covey Award and the Barwise Prize in 
2015. His former Ph.D. student, Robin K. Hill, interviews 
him herein on that and related subjects. They start with 
a discussion of the proper perspective on logic from the 
philosophy of computer science, and on the philosophy 
of computer science from logic, in response to Selmer 
Bringsjord’s commentary.2 While Rapaport doubts that the 
philosophy of computer science has anything to say, or 
has to say anything, about logic, or that logic has anything 
to say, or has to say anything, about the philosophy of 
computer science, certainly logic has something to say 
about computer science proper, e.g., it can help us to 
understand the nature of algorithms or to verify programs. 
What about the algorithm? 
Hill: The avowed logicist Selmer Bringsjord condemns the 
spotlight on the algorithm in the philosophy of computer 
science, claiming that the study of a DTS (“do-this-step­
do-that-step” process) yields an inadequate account of 
computer science, which is, in his view, a study of reasoning. 
I admire reasoning as much as the next guy, so to speak, 
but he claims that “a valid deduction by the machine from 
this set A of formulae expressed in something that looks 
quite like first-order logic, to that particular formula p, is 
what execution of my program consists in.” This is not the 
right description, in my view. We do need to emphasize the 
“DTS thingie,” the sequence of steps, just as that process 
is respected in the low-level principles of programming 
languages that implement logic programming. 
Rapaport: If you have a bunch of logically equivalent ways 
of representing or expressing something, and each has a 
very different “flavor,” does it make sense to say that one of 
them is the best or right one? I think that it is better to say 
that each sheds different light on the common phenomenon 
that is represented or expressed or analyzed, enabling us 
to see it from different perspectives, each of which may 
be more appropriate or useful in different circumstances 
or for different purposes. (You can write programs that will 
behave the same using any programming language, but 
some languages will make the job easier or be more easily 
understood by humans, etc.) Gödel was not convinced by 
his own recursive functions or by Church’s lambda calculus, 
but was by Turing’s DTS analysis. So, rather than saying 
that any of these are avoidable or unavoidable, I’d prefer 
to say that the DTS approach opened up a fruitful way of 
understanding things. Logic programming and functional 
programming, like imperative programming, have their 
own realms where each is most fruitful. 
Hill: Certainly, no one can gainsay the primacy of logic. 
Formal reasoning may be the most distinct accomplishment 
of the human race. The state of the world—not just now 
but at any time—supports Bringsjord’s personal view 
that “reasoning is by my lights something much more 
valuable to teach than DTS.” Logic served humanity long 
before computerized algorithms did. In this sense, the 
significance of computing is its novelty, which calls for 
research, whereas logic already enjoys high respectability 
in that regard. Should we resist the invitation to treat them 
as competitors? 
Rapaport: Yes; let a thousand flowers bloom. Pedagogically, 
if you find it easier to explain computation logically rather 
than imperatively, go for it. If you as student find it easier 
to understand logically rather than imperatively, fine! 
Yet Dan Dennett, in his Darwin’s Dangerous Ideas (which 
I’m just reading now for the first time) makes a point of 
distinguishing between logical approaches (specifically, 
the deductive-nomological scientific method) and an 
algorithmic approach of the sort that he claims Darwin 
took.3 
Hill: I claim that an algorithm is an abstract imperative control 
structure,4 with the imperative characteristic the most 
radical claim, and relentlessly DTS. Declarative structures, 
such as recursive definitions, are not algorithms under this 
view. One simply can’t convey, teach, explain, or show an 
algorithm without telling some computing device to do 
something. Of course, my arguments are based on the big 
names—well-known and widely taught working algorithms 
such as Binary Search and Heapsort, which enjoy a robust 
conceptual life outside of their implementations in various 
Turing Machines. I would say that the algorithm is where no 
distinction holds between satisfying and following rules;5 in 
other words, algorithms are not conceptually distinct from, 
and built upon, but rather are embodiments of, “the rules.” 
The ascription of algorithms to a category incompatible 
with the declarative nature of logic disrupts the standard 
analyses. Now, yanking algorithms out of the declarative 
logic realm altogether might assuage Professor Bringsjord’s 
concerns or it might irritate them. What do you think? Based 
on your deep dive into the nature of computer science, do 
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you recommend any reconsideration of the received views 
of other aspects of computation? 
Rapaport: You say that “an algorithm is an abstract imperative 
control structure.” I agree, but I’d prefer to say that it can 
be expressed as one, but could also be expressed logically 
or functionally. Surely both binary search and heapsort can 
be expressed not only in an imperative language like, say, 
Algol, but also in Prolog or Lisp. 
Hill: Your hospitality to philosophical views is welcome. 
The conflict between computationalists and others smacks 
of demagoguery, even hostility, and I have always been 
glad to follow your example of objective scholarship. 
How great a role does affect play? Some philosophers of 
computer science want human intellect to be demoted and 
computation raised to its proper place, while others want 
to see computation demoted and human intellect raised to 
its proper place. Should we, and can we, account for this 
somehow? 
Rapaport: I’ll use this question as an excuse to tell a story 
that I need to think about some more: My wife recently 
opened a restaurant and asked me to handle the paperwork 
and banking that needs to be done in the morning before 
opening (based on the previous day’s activities). She wrote 
out a detailed set of instructions, and one morning I went 
in with her to see if I could follow them, with her looking 
over my shoulder. As might be expected, there were gaps 
in her instructions, so even though they were detailed, 
they needed even more detail. Part of the reason for this 
was that she knew what had to be done, how to do it, and 
why it had to be done, but I didn’t. This actually disturbed 
me, because I tend to think that algorithms should really 
be just “Do A,” not “To G, do A.” Yet I felt that I needed to 
understand G in order to figure out how to do A. But I think 
the reason for that was simply that she hadn’t given me an 
algorithm, but a sketch of one, and, in order for me to fill 
in the gaps, knowing why I was doing A would help me fill 
in those gaps. But I firmly believe that if it made practical 
sense to fill in all those gaps (as it would if we were writing 
a computer program), then I wouldn’t have to ask why I 
was doing it. No “intelligence” should be needed for this 
task if the instructions were a full-fledged algorithm. If a 
procedure (a sequence of instructions, including vague 
ones like recipes) is not an algorithm (a procedure that is 
fully specified down to the last detail), then it can require 
“intelligence” to carry it out (to be able to fill in the gaps, 
based, perhaps on knowing why things are being done). 
If intelligence is not available (i.e., if the executor lacks 
relevant knowledge about the goal of the procedure), 
then the procedure had better be a full-fledged algorithm. 
There is a difference between a human trying to follow 
instructions and a machine that is designed to execute an 
algorithm. The machine cannot ask why, so its algorithm 
has to be completely detailed. But a computer (or a robot, 
because one of the tasks is going to the bank and talking to 
a teller!) that could really do the job would almost certainly 
be considered to be “intelligent.” This neither demotes 
human intellect nor raises computation, but shows how (not 
necessarily that) human intellect can be computationally 
understood. I think it’s a nice case study for Dennett’s 
“Turing’s strange inversion of reasoning,” that is, “In order 
to be a perfect and beautiful computing machine it is not 
requisite to know what arithmetic is.”6 
Hill: You note, in your most recent APA Newsletter pieces,7
that the Semantic Web is really a syntactic web, which 
provides a perfect example of your thesis. In the World 
Wide Web, a network of nodes and connections, the only 
handy meaning of a node is its location relative to other 
nodes, and the only possible meaning of a connection 
is its association of two nodes. In the Semantic Web, the 
new tags applied to markup elements, such as <date> 
or <component>, are not actual meanings in a different 
domain, but rather strings from the same category as the 
formatting markup tags such as <h1>; in other words, all 
those tags belong to the domain S of character strings. But 
how is it that we understand the <date> tag to be richer, 
more contentful, than the <h1> tag? 
Rapaport: You ask, “how is it that we understand the <date> 
tag to be richer, more contentful, than the <h1> tag?” I think 
the crucial word here is “we.” My first reaction is that we 
understand <date> more richly than <h1>, but the Semantic 
Web itself doesn’t. My second reaction is to say that the 
Semantic Web might understand <date> more richly than 
<h1> in the same way that we do, namely, by the amount 
and complexity of the connections it can make with them. 
Presumably, both of us have more and richer connections 
with dates than with tags. If you’re referring to the fact that 
the tag <date> contains the word “date,” surely that’s for 
our, human, benefit, not for the Semantic Web. (This is Drew 
McDermott’s point in his “AI Meets Artificial Stupidity.”8) 
Hill: In your analysis of the Chinese room, you point out 
that both the hamburger and the word “hamburger” map 
to neuron firings, which is the common domain. You are, 
no doubt, willing to accept another relation as part of the 
overarching domain U that associates the “hamburger” 
neuron firings with morphemes and the hamburger neuron 
firings with food. Is that how the richer connotation is 
captured? 
Rapaport: I’m not sure what U is, unless it’s the world itself, 
the world that contains not only my neuron firings but also 
certain morphemes (better?: certain sound waves) as well 
as certain real, perishable foodstuffs. But I would argue that 
I don’t have direct access to parts of U: I only have access 
to those sound waves and those foods as mediated by my 
sensory organs (OK, OK: I eat hamburgers, and that gives 
me pretty direct access to them. But in terms of seeing, 
touching, smelling, etc., it’s only via sensory organs.) Only 
God (sive Natura) would have such access. 
Hill: Professor Bringsjord notes that “[Rapaport’s] 
professional life to this point has passed through the 
evolution of the computational sciences over a period of 
decades, during which time a lot has happened.” Indeed. 
He invites you to reflect on the history, an invitation that 
I will accept for you in asking these questions: How has 
your view of the philosophy of computer science matured 
in the time that you have been thinking about it? Compared 
to your mature appreciation, was your view limited at the 
start? Which aspects are stale and which deserve more 
thought? Are there some issues still under contention that 
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are analogous to determining how many angels can dance 
on the head of a pin? Can you predict which inquiries may 
rise to prominence in the future? 
Rapaport: When I created my course, I didn’t know what 
the philosophy of computer science was, nor could I 
find anything about it, so I created my list of questions 
principally as an organizing rubric for the course: 
•	 What is CS? 
•	 Is it a science? (What is science?) – Engineering? 
(What is engineering?) 
•	 Both? 
•	 Something else? 
•	 What does it study? 
•	 Computers? (What is a computer?) – Computation? 
•	 What is computation? 
•	 What is an algorithm? 
•	 What is the Church-Turing Computability 
Thesis? 
•	 What is hypercomputation? 
•	 What is a computer program? 
•	 What is the relation of a program to the 
world? 
•	 Are programs scientific theories? 
•	 If a program implements an algorithm, 
what is implementation? 
•	 What is software, and how is it related to 
hardware? 
•	 Can or should programs be copyrighted or 
patented? 
•	 Can programs be verified? 
•	 What is AI? 
•	 What is the relation of computation to cognition? 
•	 Can computers think? 
•	 What is the Turing Test and the Chinese Room 
Argument? 
•	 Computer Ethics 
•	 Should we trust decisions made by computers? – 
Should we build intelligent computers? 
My views have matured in the sense that I have some 
firmer beliefs about where I stand on some of these issues 
than I did when I first began looking at them (and my views 
continue to mature as I revise my textbook). And the two 
ethical issues that I chose to focus on have become much 
more central to the philosophical conversation than they 
were thirteen years ago when I created the course, what 
with the advent of autonomous vehicles and advances in 
“deep learning” AI. 
I think hypercomputation might be an “angels on a pin” 
question. As for which questions might become more 
prominent, perhaps the issue of how computer programs 
relate to the real world that they model is one of them, or 
the issue that you discuss and that I formulate as “Is the 
form of an algorithm A to accomplish goal G merely ‘Do A’ 
or is it ‘To accomplish G, do A’?” (These may be the same 
issue.) 
*** 
Since 2005, Dr. Rapaport has been developing, publishing, 
and exercising teaching materials for the philosophy of 
computer science, asking and answering myriad questions 
connected with the exploration and establishment of that 
subject in the academy. In Professor Rapaport’s outline of 
the philosophy of computer science, we see examination 
of every aspect of computer science. We look forward to 
more disciplined elaboration, complete with encyclopedic 
references, of this interesting subject that deploys a 
perspective from the humanities to reflect on the roots of 
technology. 
NOTES 
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4.	 Robin K. Hill, “What an Algorithm Is.” 
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6.	 Daniel Dennett, “Examining the Work and Its Later Impact: Daniel 
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TEACHING PHILOSOPHY ONLINE 
Synchronous Online Philosophy Courses: 
An Experiment in Progress 
Fritz J. McDonald 
OAKLAND UNIVERSITY 
There are a number of reasons why professors teach online. 
Some have decided on their own to do so. Some might have 
been pressured by their colleges or universities to teach 
online. As Peter Boltuc has stressed in this newsletter, as 
more and more online courses are offered, it is vital for the 
survival of philosophy as a profession that philosophy is 
taught online.1 If philosophers do not take the opportunity 
to teach such courses, we risk the possibility of losing 
students completely who might otherwise take philosophy 
classes. 
In my own case, I decided to teach online for practical 
reasons. I live in Ann Arbor, Michigan, and my university 
is fifty-five miles away in Metro Detroit. Saving myself a 
two-hour-a-day commute is quite useful for personal and 
financial reasons. I do love teaching, and my hope was that 
I could teach online while not leaving behind the elements 
of teaching that I love the most. 
Many of my colleagues teach online, and the most common 
approach, I have found, is the asynchronous course. In an 
asynchronous online course, students can do work at any 
time, generally at their own pace, without any required class 
sessions. This is a good thing for students with complex 
life and work schedules. In my experiments in online 
teaching, I have taken a synchronous approach instead. In 
a synchronous online course, there are required meeting 
times where students and professors gather together in an 
online environment. 
It is not my purpose here to argue that synchronous 
courses are superior to or even inferior to asynchronous 
online courses. To really study this issue, one would have 
to ensure that the asynchronous and synchronous courses 
being studied were similar in many relevant respects 
except insofar as they are asynchronous or synchronous. 
This would be difficult. It certainly seems possible that a 
good asynchronous course could be much better than a 
poor synchronous course and that a good synchronous 
course is better than a poor asynchronous course. How do 
we compare courses when the quality of instruction can 
differ in any class? College courses are complex things, 
and a lot has to be taken into consideration to make 
any good comparisons. Blanket judgments of relative 
quality between broad categories like synchronous and 
asynchronous courses, or face-to-face and online courses, 
are likely to be somewhat dubious. 
As a result, I view my own work in teaching online as 
something of an experiment in progress. At Oakland 
University in Rochester, Michigan, where I am an associate 
professor of philosophy, I have taught several online­
only courses using synchronous elements. These courses 
include Introduction to Philosophy, Introduction to Ethics, 
Ancient Greek Philosophy, and Early Modern Philosophy. 
All of these courses involve the teaching of historical 
materials, particularly because our introductory philosophy 
and ethics courses at Oakland University are part of the 
Western civilization component of our general education 
program. To get my students to learn important aspects of 
Western civilization and the history of philosophy, I require 
them to do extensive reading of historical texts and a good 
deal of writing. 
At my university, we use the open-source course 
management software Moodle. Moodle contains 
resources for assignment collection, journals, forums, and 
a gradebook, among many other features. We also have 
access to the videoconferencing software WebEx from Cisco. 
There is other software, such as Elluminate, that can serve 
similar purposes. Faculty have also used popular software 
such as Skype or Google Hangouts for videoconferencing. 
E-Learning and Instructional Services (E-LIS) at Oakland 
University linked WebEx to Moodle, so videoconferencing 
sessions and recordings of these sessions can be accessed 
directly through the course management software. 
VIDEOCONFERENCING AND THE ONLINE
CLASSROOM 
My aim in the courses I teach is to use the technology 
available to create online courses that do not lack any of 
the elements that might be helpful in good face-to-face 
instruction. To do this, I have leaned fairly heavily on the 
videoconferencing software. In all of my online courses, 
I have put in the university schedule of classes language 
indicating that there will be required, regularly scheduled, 
online course sessions on specific dates and times. One of 
the challenges I have faced is that students do not always 
read the schedule of classes completely and closely; 
so I have had to explain the requirement of attendance 
at videoconferencing sessions on several occasions to 
students, sometimes after they had registered, very often 
after the course start date. 
Software such as Cisco WebEx provides many resources 
that are highly useful for online class sessions. I can use 
my computer’s webcam and microphone to broadcast 
video and audio of myself. WebEx also allows for the 
broadcasting of whatever is on the screen of my laptop. 
This can include a presentation, whether made in Microsoft 
PowerPoint, Apple Keynote, Google Slides, or any other 
presentation software. In fact, anything whatsoever that 
can be displayed on a computer, including video, can be 
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displayed live to students who are viewing the WebEx 
presentation. 
WebEx also allows my students to broadcast audio and 
video of themselves to the class. One of my favorite 
features of the software is that the window that contains 
video of the instructor automatically switches to show 
video and broadcast audio of anyone who happens to 
raise their voice during the class session. This is seamless 
when it works well. (As noted below, it does not always 
work well). So if I have finished making a point, and one of 
my students wants to make a point herself, as soon as she 
starts talking, audio and video of her is broadcast to the 
entire class. 
It is also possible to allow students or other participants 
in the class to capture the images on their screens and 
broadcast them to the class. So, if you would like your 
students to give in-class presentations, it is possible to 
have your students use the resources of WebEx to present 
PowerPoints or any other sort of presentation from their 
own computer screen to the entire class. Whatever your 
student puts on her desktop can be broadcast to the class. 
Students do not need to use audio or video in WebEx to 
communicate with me and with each other. The software 
also contains a chat window, where the instructor and 
students can send messages either to the entire class or to 
each other. In my experience, this sometimes brings about 
more class discussion than is common in my face-to-face 
classes: my students have tended to be very comfortable 
with communicating through text. 
In case you do not want your students to broadcast audio or 
video, or to participate in chat, there is a feature in WebEx 
that allows you to deny permission to any student in the 
class to utilize such features. 
In addition to the ability to broadcast presentations to one’s 
students, one can type or draw using the virtual whiteboard 
contained in the software. This whiteboard has its limits, and 
it does not allow for the kind of quick drawing one might 
like to use to create, say, logic diagrams. To make up for the 
lack of a chalkboard or whiteboard in the videoconferencing 
environment, I purchased a USB document camera. I use 
an IPEVO Ziggi-HD High Definition camera. When attached 
to my laptop, I can use the document camera’s software 
to put images on my screen of whatever I happen to 
be drawing at a given time. This allows for the real-time 
writing of anything whatsoever. This seems like it would 
be especially useful for teaching logic—one could write 
out a truth-table or truth-tree live on a piece of paper for 
students. The WebEx feature that allows me to broadcast 
whatever is on my screen allows me to broadcast the live 
video I am capturing with my document camera. 
A further useful feature of broadcasting with the document 
camera is the ability to display a textbook. I can show the 
students specific passages from the textbook to guide 
them to particular words or a diagram. I like to do a lot 
of close readings of texts in my classes, so the ability to 
display the text comes in quite handy. 
While I require my students to attend the online class 
sessions, it is, of course, unavoidable that some students 
might miss class for emergencies. Fortunately, WebEx 
allows for the recording of online class sessions. These 
recordings contain all of the elements noted above—the 
video and audio of myself, the video of whatever is on my 
screen at a given time, audio and video of my students, and 
the text from the online chat sessions. 
Were this sort of online environment to work perfectly, I 
cannot think of any element of a face-to-face class that 
would be missing from this kind of online environment. 
This might help overcome objections from those who 
think philosophy can only be done best in the face-to­
face environment. Lecturing, one obvious element of the 
traditional face-to-face class, is easily made possible. 
Perhaps more importantly, discussion can occur as well. 
The professor can use presentation software to convey 
information, and so can the students. A document camera 
allows one to use a writing surface to present text, diagrams, 
or pictures. Videoconferencing even allows for additional 
elements that are not part of the typical face-to-face 
classroom environment, such as the chat feature, which 
allows professors or students to send text to the entire 
classroom or to each other. As I mentioned above, this 
chat feature proves really useful for spurring discussion. As 
Frank McCluskey has noted, “It is well known that introverts 
prefer writing to speaking. So here is medium where they 
are able to take chances in ways they might not in the 
bricks and mortar classroom.”2 In my experience, this is 
true of live online chat writing. 
Videoconferencing is not the only online resource I have 
found helpful. The many elements of the Moodle course 
management software we use at Oakland University come 
in quite handy. For example, as many professors have 
encountered, it can be difficult to get students to do the 
reading. So I use the journal feature on Moodle. I require 
students to write about each reading before we discuss 
them in the online class session. These journal entries are 
graded, and they are a quite useful way in any class to get 
students to do the reading. 
The kind of synchronous class I offer hence has the 
potential to contain all of the relevant features of face-to­
face classes, and there is no reason not to also use all of 
the useful elements that have been part of asynchronous 
online classes as well. Nothing prevents the teacher of the 
synchronous class from also including recorded lectures, 
using an online forum for discussion, or using a software 
program to provide guided instruction. Anything that can 
be done in an asynchronous class can obviously be done 
in a synchronous class as well. So it would seem that 
synchronous online classes have their own advantages 
while not missing any of the advantages of asynchronous 
online instruction or face-to-face instruction. 
LIMITS OF THE SYNCHRONOUS CLASS 
While, in the ideal, there should be nothing lost in a 
synchronous online course, I have faced a number of 
difficulties over the past five years of teaching online. 
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I face the challenge of conveying the importance 
of synchronous class sessions to students who are 
accustomed to taking asynchronous online courses. I have 
had students balk at the requirement to show up regularly 
for online classes. One of my students told me early in a 
semester that my requirement that students show up at 
a regular time for online classes was the stupidest thing 
he had ever heard. There have been complaints about my 
synchronous approach to teaching courses, including in 
my teaching evaluations. Even students who have spent an 
entire semester registered in my class without dropping 
have complained about the synchronous element in 
their student evaluations. It seems to me that a number 
of students have had the impression that it is almost by 
definition that an online class is an asynchronous online 
class, where one can work on one’s own schedule without 
a required class time. 
I am sympathetic to the needs and concerns of students
who would be best served by asynchronous classes. Some
students have work or life schedules that prevent them from
being available regularly at a given time. I have had students
in the military whose work prevents them from involvement
in such a class. All that being said, I do indicate to my
students, both in our schedule of classes and immediately
at the beginning of the class, that there are mandatory
online videoconferencing sessions. This sometimes leads
to students dropping my section of the class. Even at a
university with a robust online program such as Oakland
University, this might possibly lead to lower student demand
for online courses with required synchronous elements. This
is a concern. As noted above, Peter Boltuc has rightly stressed
the importance for philosophy as a profession of offering
online courses that appeal to students. The administrators
at my university are certainly interested in all of my courses
having a heavy enrollment! 
In my experiences teaching online, I have not been able 
to achieve the ideal environment I had hoped for. As a 
result, I do think, until student preparation and technology 
advances, there are some significant limits to the use of 
synchronous online teaching sessions in courses. 
I base the following points only on my own experiences. 
Others might have had different experiences, more 
positive or negative. This is a place where greater study and 
collection of data across the profession might be useful for 
improving online instruction.
I find that students are hesitant to use the audio and video 
capturing features available from their own computers. 
I often have to tell students to turn on their webcams or 
microphones to make video and audio of themselves 
available. WebEx does not automatically turn on webcams 
and microphones. Even after insisting on the students 
turning their equipment on, there are still a significant 
number of students in my courses who never turn on 
their microphones or webcams. I suspect I have had a 
few students who do not even have webcams and/or 
microphones on their computers. 
When the relevant equipment is turned on, the students 
are not always in the best environments for philosophical 
discussion. Unlike the controlled environment of a 
classroom, a virtual classroom composed of video and 
audio captured from a number of students’ computers can 
contain many distractions. Friends and family can often be 
heard in the background. Crying babies are not uncommon. 
Noises of all sorts interfere with the discussion. 
Joshua Kim has noted issues of this sort in Inside Higher 
Education: 
The other audio problem that I see is feedback. 
Students forget to mute their computer audio, 
causing terrible echoes. Or background noise, the 
barking dog or busy office, makes it difficult for 
everyone to hear. Online meetings are often loud 
and distracting events. I’m not sure how to achieve 
a quieter experience.3 
To best allow for really good discussion, all students 
should be in a relatively quiet environment with minimal 
distractions. Getting actual, real-world students to do this 
during synchronous online class sessions is a difficult task. 
A number of students will not have excellent presentation 
skills. We are not all accustomed to broadcasting ourselves 
to others. I have encountered some difficulties with 
poorly placed webcams and microphones. A number of 
students do a poor job of using the technology on hand 
to communicate. This is not a skill that all students have 
practiced or learned. 
There is still a serious concern of a digital divide. Not every 
student will have the computer, webcam, microphone, and 
high-speed internet access required for videoconferencing. 
There are also issues of disability and accommodation. 
Elements of online learning that might best serve disabled 
students might not serve other populations of disabled 
students well. A student who might be best served by a 
text-only online course might be at a disadvantage in a text, 
video, and audio class such as mine. 
An instructor might also, by teaching a course using 
videoconferencing technology, lose some of the historical 
advantages of text-based online education. Ron Barnette 
has noted the ways in which an online environment might 
be useful insofar as it removes any sort of influence factors 
like race, gender, or age might have upon listeners to an 
open discussion.4 If students are using webcams and audio, 
some of the effects of factors such as this might reoccur. 
In the ideal environment, the technology currently available 
ought to allow for online courses to have all of the positive 
features of traditional face-to-face classes. Terry Weldin-
Frisch has expressed a similar opinion of synchronous 
online instruction in this newsletter: 
There is simply no good reason to think that this 
particular educational delivery method cannot 
be perfected in such a way that long held 
predispositions regarding the second-rate quality 
of online philosophical education need continue 
to dominate a twenty-first century educational 
milieu.5 
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Perhaps in the near future this perfection will be achieved. 
Even in the present day, where technology is such a key 
part of our lives, a cultural shift is required, with students 
being more prepared, both personally and with their 
technology, to bring to the table what is needed for a good 
synchronous online class. 
It is also worth noting that not all universities and colleges 
have put the considerable resources that my own university 
has put into online education. I have been provided with 
some of the best hardware and software available for 
teaching online, and I recognize that I am fortunate to have 
it. 
THE FUTURE OF ONLINE PHILOSOPHY
EDUCATION 
It is exciting to think of what technology might make 
possible. More and more, computing is done not on 
desktop or laptop computers but on smartphones, tablets, 
and wearable devices. If the kind of technology I am using 
now is able to be ported well to such devices in the future, 
synchronous online videoconferencing classes might be 
even more accessible in a wide range of environments, 
including for students who have cut the cord on broadband 
in favor of cellular-only data. 
With many challenges having been noted, I have had 
several good experiences teaching a number of students 
online, and I have found the experience of teaching using 
videoconferencing software to be often as rewarding as 
the experience of teaching in the traditional face-to-face 
environment. At times, it has even been better. When 
videoconferencing works, it makes possible in online 
classes what has henceforth only been possible within the 
physical classroom. 
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The Paradox of Online Learning 
Adrienne Anderson 
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS, SPRINGFIELD 
Marshall McLuhan observed that “we shape our tools and 
afterwards our tools shape us.” The truth of this statement 
has never been more apparent to me than after reflecting 
on my e-learning experience. The time spent in the digital 
classroom studying philosophy has affected me, my way of 
being, and my worldview, which is truly valued. However, 
in contemplating my experience, it is clear that for every 
pro, there is also a con. The strengths of online learning 
seem to be, at this moment in time, also its weaknesses. 
The purpose of this paper is to shed light on the advantages 
and disadvantages of e-learning in pursuit of progress 
for prospective students of cyberlearning and facilitators 
within the field. 
Similar to the online gaming world where you are free to be 
and act according to your desires, digital learning provides 
students the liberty to explore ideas and fully express 
them in an environment where physicality is completely 
removed. Engagement occurs strictly within the infosphere 
where inhibitions that accompany age, race, class, and/ 
or physical threats are significantly lessened. Students 
participate in the safety and convenience of their own 
home. Consequently, thoughts and ideas can be expressed 
openly and without the physical fear or anxiety that is 
sometimes experienced in traditional classroom settings. 
At the same time, cyberlearning completely ignores the 
physical body. Experiential learning, which promotes a 
unique type of knowledge, is nonexistent. Signals that the 
body receives from others in a classroom environment, 
which can serve to inform the mind, is just not available 
online. Passion of experience, which is retained and 
reflected in the body, is excluded from the online 
experience. The physical aspect of learning is a missing 
piece within the digital space. 
Another feature of traditional learning that is absent in 
online learning is the time-honored role of a professor 
who lectures and disseminates information into a bunch 
of empty heads. Rather, instructors utilize the online forum 
to post critical questions that promote guided discussions. 
Students are free to read and take in information at their 
own pace. Responses are then shared openly in an online 
forum wherein each student initiates a discussion, as 
opposed to following one main discussion led by an all-
knowing teacher. This allows for dynamic discussions to 
take place among students and facilitator. Contributions to 
different discussions occur during the week within multiple 
threads, allowing time for reflection and integration of new 
information. Learning is enhanced from the perspective of 
others, not just a single Mind who expects information to 
simply be parroted back. 
As a result of an exorbitant amount of time reading and 
writing online, those skills are remarkably enhanced. As a 
philosophy student, the ability to present a clear, concise 
argument and to engage others online becomes second 
nature. Writing online provides immediate feedback due to 
the ability to gauge your work and the work of others’ and 
allows for self-assessment and redirection if necessary. This 
approach, at first glance, is liberating and revolutionary. 
However, as my education progressed, it became clear that 
there are significant drawbacks to this approach as well. 
I was shocked to find out that I had difficulty expressing into 
words the material I had so passionately studied online. In 
natural conversations in everyday life with family, friends, 
and coworkers, I found that the philosophical concepts 
and ideas I had read and written about were sometimes 
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swirling above my head. It was difficult to filter them 
down into coherent sentences. Outside my experience 
as a student, my entire adult career has been as a court 
reporter. I listen to sounds and carry those sounds through 
my hands into the written word, completely bypassing my 
mouth. The online college experience is no different. It is 
extremely reading and writing intensive; however, it omits 
speech entirely in the process. Verbal expression of ideas 
is entirely lacking. My mind quickly turns to a story from the 
book Mirrors wherein it states, “Hunger, which kills silently, 
kills the silent. Experts speak for them, poorologists who 
tell us what the poor do not work at, what they do not eat, 
what they do not weigh, what height they do not reach, 
what they do not have, what they do not think, what parties 
they do not vote for, what they do not believe in.”1 The 
poor, the marginalized, the weak, they do not have a voice. 
In order to be heard, it is necessary to be able to speak. 
With this revelation, it is clear that an oral pathway must 
be formed and grounded in reality if students want to be 
fully empowered in the world. Therefore, it is absolutely 
necessary that verbalization is more explored in the 
e-learning community. 
If it were not for e-learning, however, I would not have been 
afforded the opportunity to expand my education and, 
consequently, worldview. Its accessibility, flexibility, and 
affordability cannot be found in brick-and-mortar schools. 
As a full-time working, single mother, I was able to manage 
my time and availability in accordance with my hand-picked 
class schedule. Adhering to a set schedule dictated by an 
institution would not have been viable. Although online 
learning is a solitary and sometimes lonely endeavor, it is 
also extremely rewarding and gratifying. It opened me up 
to worlds I never would have imagined existed. The ideas I 
have been exposed to are now navigating my life in a new 
direction that seeks to augment reality with the help of the 
digital world, which, ironically, is the whole point of online 
learning. 
So is e-learning perfect? No, but neither is traditional 
learning. They both have their pros and cons. However, 
online learning is a convenient entry point into the 
educational system for those who cannot otherwise access 
it. Although online learning lacks the physical aspects of 
engagement such as the essential ability to orally express 
ideas, it nevertheless provides a pedagogy that provides 
a new depth of interaction that involves the ability to 
follow and explore multiple threads of thought and ideas 
from a variety of perspectives. As reality transforms due to 
technological advances, e-learning serves as a gateway to 
the masses to navigate in this new world. As we transition 
from a separate offline life to a fully integrated digital life, 
the advantages and disadvantages will, no doubt, become 
a moot point. 
NOTES 
1.	 Eduardo Galeano, Mirrors: Stories of Almost Everyone (Nation 
Books, 2009), 125. 
Sustaining Success in an Increasingly 
Competitive Online Landscape 
Jeff Harmon 
SOUTHEAST MISSOURI STATE UNIVERSITY 
The line between for-profit and not-for-profit universities 
is being blurred everywhere as state or publicly funded 
universities are receiving less funding from their respective 
governments. While the online education market is global, 
the US market is more mature, and can serve as a good 
example for European and other universities to learn from. 
But even as these differences become more profound, 
some aspects of this industry segment have not changed 
at the rate that many of us expected. 
Recently, I was searching for new insights in online 
education marketing. To my surprise, when I searched 
for those terms on Google, the first result below the ads 
was a link to my presentation from the 2004 University of 
Wisconsin distance education conference. Much of what 
I discussed included many of the options available today 
such as search engine optimization, pay per click ads, and 
content marketing. For this article however, we will start 
the discussion at a higher level—the institutional brand. 
THE BRAND 
Your institution brand is not just a logo. It is comprised of so 
much more. The brand is the complete experience. And that 
experience is created and delivered by the staff and faculty 
of your institution. In the brand training sessions I lead, I 
try to instill the thought that each of us has a responsibility 
to treat our students (customers) professionally and 
consistently. Yes, the students are customers who can 
purchase their education elsewhere. And online, the 
process of choice is very convenient. Think about your 
favorite retail store or restaurant and how it makes you feel 
special every time you frequent the establishment. That is 
what we should be striving for as an experience for our 
students. So how do we deliver on a brand promise in the 
online environment? For starters, let’s reply to student 
emails promptly and also ensure our technology support 
team does the same. There is nothing more frustrating for 
students than technology that is not working at the time 
they need it most. 
Communication style is another way by which we convey 
the brand. At Southeast Missouri State, we communicate 
our brand by using particular personality terms that we 
believe bring our brand to life. Your institution probably has 
personality words as well. But it is not just the words that 
matter. The tone, particularly in personal communication, 
can have an impact on your students’ perception of your 
institution. When good students transfer and share the 
negative experience in social media platforms, the results 
are certainly negative for the brand. 
LET’S TALK MARKET RESEARCH 
The importance of market research cannot be overstated. 
Understanding your prospective and current customers is 
invaluable, and too often dismissed due to time, budget, or 
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expertise. Not only should we be researching how to best 
reach our prospective students, but we also must prove 
that there is demand for any new degree programs prior to 
developing plans to launch. 
A recent study regarding the online student market by the 
Learning House and Aslanian Marketing Research1 revealed 
a few important statistics: 
•	 65 percent of online students choose an institution 
within one hundred miles 
•	 Direct mail is very effective 
•	 Affordability and accreditation are the top 
messages 
•	 Follow-up with prospective students within twenty-
four to forty-eight hours is imperative 
I was surprised that direct mail is considered effective in 
this environment. After a few conversations with colleagues 
around the country, we are all experiencing a resurgence of 
effectiveness of direct mail. It seems there is less noise in 
this channel and thus, it is working quite well. 
LANDING PAGES AND TRACKING 
Maximizing return on investment from marketing tactics 
requires special attention and effort. Many things must 
be in place. First, always consider creating special landing 
pages for campaigns. If the landing page is similar to 
an ad a prospective student clicked on or watched, they 
will know they are at the right place. The chance of them 
taking an action is dramatically increased because of this. 
If you cannot create a special page, please ensure that 
your online degree pages are consistent and succinct, and 
include phone, chat, a web form, etc. Make it as easy as 
possible for prospective students to connect with you. 
You also need to ensure you are maximizing the potential 
of your everyday online degree website. The home page 
and all of the degree pages must be well optimized for the 
search engines. While great search results are not easily 
obtained, you will be surprised at how much more visible 
your pages can be with a little effort. Let me give you an 
example of why this is so important. 
Generating leads with pay-per-click ads can cost hundreds 
of dollars per lead, especially if you do not have the 
expertise to properly target the ads and set up campaigns 
in Google or Facebook. Look for a Google Partner to assist 
you at https://www.google.com/partners/. Listing your
degree programs on lead aggregator sites is an easier
alternative. Consider sites such as GetEducated.com or US
News Degree Finder. These leads will cost $50 to $150 each. 
But why is search engine optimization (SEO) so important? 
SEO is important because it will generate organic leads 
from prospective students who are genuinely interested in 
your degree program and institution, and will convert at a 
rate much higher than leads from ads or other websites. 
Organic leads are naturally more familiar with your brand 
and want to connect. Secondly, they cost practically 
nothing. While at University of Illinois Online (UIOL), we 
optimized our home page for the phrase “online degrees.” 
We stayed in the top five results on Google for three years. 
That effort generated nearly 1,200 leads per month for free. 
It could cost more than $120,000 per month to generate or 
purchase that number of leads. 
The first step was to create an inquiry form accessible 
from each degree program description page. Then, work 
to optimize every single page for the search engines. 
Optimization includes the following basic tasks: 
•	 Check Google Trends (https://www.google.com/ 
trends/explore#) to ensure you are optimizing for 
the best terms 
•	 Include the degree and institution name (which 
should include the top terms) in the page title. 
•	 Ensure that the best terms are also used at least 
three times in the page content. The more they are 
used the better. 
•	 Create alt tags for images and use the same top 
terms. 
•	 Create a news section on the homepage so that 
Google sees fresh content appear. If your content 
gets stagnant, Google knows and will lower the 
page rank.2 
You should see improvement in the search results within a 
couple of weeks. Keep tweaking and updating content for 
continual improvement. 
TRACKING SUCCESS 
In order to get the most out of every advertising dollar 
(or lack thereof) you need to track return on investment 
(ROI). There are several ways to accomplish this. For 
every web ad (Google, Facebook, YouTube, etc.), you will 
be asked for a click destination URL when you place the 
ad. Let’s say you want visitors to go to http://semo.edu/ 
admissions. The URL you submit will need to be more 
complicated than that in order to provide tracking data. 
You need to add variables describing the source, content, 
and campaign, etc. And you need to set up your customer 
relationship management (CRM) system to receive the 
data and save it with each prospective student record. A 
tracking URL for the page listed above could be http:// 
www.semo.edu/admissions?utm_source=facebook&utm_ 
m e d i u m = w e b & u t m _ c o n t e n t = L o w Tu i t i o n & u t m _  
campaign=SEOnlineFall2016. 
Notice that everything in bold is for tracking. If you only 
have one variable, and that variable is “source,” then the 
additional text you add at the end could be simply. ?utm_ 
source=facebook. You can add as many variables as you 
wish. By doing this, you will be able to see what campaigns, 
ads, and even specific messaging produces the highest 
ROI and thus the best results. 
In order to calculate marketing ROI on a campaign, you 
need to establish the average value of a student. So let’s say 
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your financial office has established that the average value 
of an online student is $10,000. Calculate the campaign ROI 
as follows: 
Campaign cost = $100,000 
New Students Enrolled = 30 
Revenue Value of 30 Students = 30 x $10,000 = $300,000 
Value of Students - Marketing Cost  $300,000 - $100,000
              Marketing Cost  $100,000 
ROI = 200% 
MARKETING CHANNELS TO CONSIDER 
There are many ways to reach prospective online students, 
and not all of them are online. Naturally, web ads are a great 
way to start, but an integrated approach will always work 
best. For example, direct mail is great for driving traffic to a 
website. If an admissions representative is going to attend 
an education fair at a large company in a particular city, it 
would be a good idea to place web ads in that geographical 
location a week or two prior to the event. The ads would 
be targeted to the audience the representative will interact 
with at the fair in order to increase awareness and interest 
in advance. The result will be much more traffic to the 
representative’s table. 
Recommended channels for consideration include the 
following: 
•	 Google ad network (includes desktop and mobile) 
•	 Facebook ads and post boosts 
•	 You Tube commercials 
•	 Twitter 
•	 Instagram 
•	 Pinterest 
•	 Pandora 
•	 Direct Mail 
•	 Radio 
•	 Television 
•	 Billboards 
•	 US News Degree Finder 
•	 Get Educated.com 
You might be wondering why Spotify is missing. Spotify
requires a minimum expenditure that is quite high and would
not make sense for most institutions. Google, Facebook,
and You Tube should be part of any marketing mix. You can
easily target and maintain tight control on your budget.
Tracking is easily managed as well. If you have a slightly
larger budget, consider adding Pandora audio and digital
ads, Twitter, and Instagram. Larger brands such as Apple are
really starting to view Instagram as a powerful brand builder.
Pinterest may seem an outlier, but many brands are seeing it
as a requirement. Direct mail is still very effective but can be
expensive. And TV and radio, while effective, require a very
large budget in order to be effective. Billboards are great for
awareness, but there is no way to track effectiveness unless
your team is very good at asking each new student how they
found out about your programs. 
INFRASTRUCTURE 
Every single thing that has been discussed in this article 
should not be implemented if you do not have the proper 
infrastructure in place. And by that I mean software, people, 
and processes. Institutions waste hundreds of thousands 
of marketing dollars due to lack of infrastructure. 
First, institutional administration must all be supportive 
and clearly understand the complex nature of offering 
online degrees and the effects on capacity of traditional 
face-to-face students who wish to take an online course. 
In fact, many traditional on-campus students take at least 
one online course per year, and the trend is growing. 
About 5.8 million students were enrolled in at least one 
distance learning course in fall 2014—up 3.9 percent
from the previous fall, according to “Online Report Card: 
Tracking Online Education in the United States,” an annual 
report by the Babson Survey Research Group.3 This trend 
causes many problems for enrollment managers for online 
degree programs. Colorado State University attempted to 
make it easier to manage the online degree enterprise by 
launching Colorado State University’s CSU Global Campus. 
It is a completely separate entity, free from restraints of 
managing seats for on campus and online students. This is 
just one example, and I believe the level of success of this 
venture cannot yet be measured. The University of Illinois 
failed when it launched the U of I Global Campus. There 
could be many reasons for the success or failure of these 
entities. 
Other issues that may arise when attempting to grow online 
programs tied to the main institution include developing a 
good strategy for using adjunct faculty, and establishing 
course content that can be used without strings attached 
by strict agreements with faculty. In other words, efficiency 
is key. There is no need to market programs if an institution 
does not have a solid plan addressing all of these areas 
that will constrain growth. 
If all of these issues regarding capacity (product availability) 
are taken care of, congratulations, you are ready to put a 
team together and give them the tools to succeed. 
First, identify if you have a Customer Relationship 
Management (CRM) system in place through your 
admissions team that you can leverage. If not, they 
probably need one, and you should consider Salesforce. 
com. Salesforce has plugins for many marketing tools that 
will allow your marketing team to be incredibly efficient. 
Salesforce also has a foundation that allows nonprofits to 
use up to ten licenses for free. You will need to do some 
customization to give the system a higher education 
nomenclature, but it can certainly be done. There are 
also third-party companies who have already customized 
Salesforce for higher education, but their versions come 
with a hefty price tag and annual fees. 
You probably have great advisors that can get applicants 
and current students where they need to go to be 
successful, but practically no nonprofit understands the 
realities regarding “selling” online degree programs. The 
market has become very competitive; just complete a lead 
form at University of Florida Online, Arizona State University 
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Online, or try a for-profit such as Grand Canyon University. 
Once they have your mobile number and email address, I 
think you will fully understand the competitive nature of the 
online education industry. Once these institutions receive a 
lead from a prospective student, they begin calling within 
just a couple of hours. You may even get a call within fifteen 
minutes. Once, I secret shopped University of Phoenix and 
received eight calls in twenty-four hours. While you do not 
need to be this aggressive, you do need to understand 
what the competition is doing. 
So how do you compete? You either need to hire enough 
admissions reps (sales reps) in-house or consider 
outsourcing. A couple of trusted firms to keep in mind 
are Perdia Education and Barker Education Services Team. 
Perdia just launched an enrollment management mobile 
app that ensures prospective students move through 
the enrollment process efficiently and easily. Because of 
this, the conversion rate increases dramatically. Pearson 
Education has been a large player in this area as well as all 
other aspects of higher education for some time. They may 
also be a viable solution. 
Lastly, I want to share some numbers. If you plan to grow, 
you need to clearly understand how many admissions reps 
you need to get you to your goal. One rep can handle 150 
leads per month—converting to ten to fifteen enrolled 
students per rep on average. 
Five hundred to 1,000 older leads can be managed per 
rep while working new leads. These numbers have been 
vetted by discussions with higher education call center 
professionals. 
So, after reading this article, are you ready to take your 
institution’s online degree program enrollment to the next 
level? I think you have much to think about. 
NOTES 
1.	 David L. Clinefelter and Carol B. Aslanian, Online College Students 
2016: Comprehensive Data on Demands and Preferences. Rep. 
Louisville: Learning House and Education Dynamics, 2016. 
2.	 Christopher Ratcliff, “Search Engine Watch,” Guide to Google 
Ranking Signals Part 4 Content Freshness Comments. Search 
Engine Watch, September 26, 2016. 
3.	 I. Elaine Allen, and Jeff Seaman, Online Report Card Tracking 
Online Education in the United States. Rep. Online Learning 
Consortium, February 2016, http://onlinelearningconsortium. 
org/read/online-report-card-tracking-online-education-united­
states-2015/. 
CALL FOR PAPERS 
It is our pleasure to invite all potential authors to submit to the 
APA Newsletter on Philosophy and Computers. Committee 
members have priority since this is the newsletter of the 
committee, but anyone is encouraged to submit. We 
publish papers that tie in philosophy and computer science 
or some aspect of “computers”; hence, we do not publish 
articles in other sub-disciplines of philosophy. All papers 
will be reviewed, but only a small group can be published. 
The area of philosophy and computers lies among a number 
of professional disciplines (such as philosophy, cognitive 
science, computer science). We try not to impose writing 
guidelines of one discipline, but consistency of references 
is required for publication and should follow the Chicago 
Manual of Style. Inquiries should be addressed to the 
editor, Dr. Peter Boltuc, at pboltu@sgh.waw.pl. 
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